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NOTES
CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICATION:
A LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL SURVEY
"Noah was the first tiller of the soil. He planted a vineyard;
and he drank of the wine, and became drunk . . ." Genesis
9:20-21.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the current emphasis being placed on highway safety it
might seem superfluous to recite traffic accident statistics. How-
ever, these statistics form the very basis of the problem with which
we are here concerned. It is interesting, and somewhat appalling,
to review briefly the accident situation in the State of North
Dakota.
In 1959, the State Registrar of Motor Vehicles licensed 341,098'
motor vehicles and 326,9512 vehicle operators. In the same period,
these and other operators were involved in 14,687 reported acci-
dents resulting in one hundred and sixty deaths and 2,940 injuries.'
These same accidents cost the people of North Dakota some 23.6
million dollars. 4
In the study we are concerned with a particular aspect of this
grisly problem: Twenty-six per cent of the drivers involved in fatal
accidents in North Dakota, in 1959, had been drinking.5 Also dur-
ing 1959, eighteen hundred and twenty three" drivers licenses were
either suspended or revoked for operation of a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor and five hundred ninety-five'
convictions for the same offense were had without suspension or re-
vocation. In addition to this, 2,456 drivers were convicted of carry-
ing open bottles or containers of intoxicating liquor in their auto-
mobiles." As this is being written, North Dakota's traffic fatality
rate is twice that of one year ago. Thus the problem has been
stated and we now enter our consideration of a hopeful solution -
Chemical Testing For Intoxication.
A. PAST CONSIDERATIONS
To date, no tests are available to law enforcement personnel
1. Rep't of Safety Responsibility Division, N.D. State Highway Dep't, Traffic Accident
Facts and Statistical Rep't 4 (1959).
2. Id. at 15
3. Id. at 6.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 13.
7. Id. at 14.
8. Ibid.
NOTES
which allow a measure of the physiologic response one experiences
after partaking of, and assimilating an amount of alcoholic bever-
ages.' Prior to the introduction of chemical tests to determine in-
toxicaton, authorities were forced to resort to haphazard methods of
ascertaining whether an individual might be under the influence of
intoxicants. Suspects were subjected to a myriad of physical and
mental gymnastics. The observations and subsequent testimony of
those witnesses present at the time of the arrest of a suspect was
often the only information available to the courts. Most of those
observations consisted of detection of the odor of alcohol on the
breath, facial coloring, eye coloring, articulation, condition of cloth-
ing, attitude of the suspect to the arresting officer, balance, ability
to walk or turn normally, ability to pick up small objects from the
floor and ability to touch the index finger to the nose.
Due to the severe penalties imposed upon drunken drivers these
methods were not deemed adequate. One major work on chemical
testing lists many pathological conditions having symtoms approxi-
mating those of alcoholic influence." Any of these conditions with
their accompanying physical impairments could give an untrained
observer the impression that the subject had been under the in-
fluence of intoxicants.
Long before the advent of the automobile and the drunken
driver, the courts were forced to approximate the physiological re-
sponse to a given amount of alcohol taken into the body, and the
problem remains. The court, in Elkin v. Buschner," an 1888 Penn-
sylvania decision, stated:
"There are degrees of intoxication or drunkeness, as everyone
knows. A man is said to be dead drunk when he is perfectly
unconscious, powerless. He is said to be stupidly drunk when
a kind of stupor comes over him. He is said to be staggering
drunk when he staggers in walking. He is said to be foolishly
drunk when he acts the fool."'12
As the death toll on the highways increased, the state legislatures
felt obliged to enact legislation prohibiting the use of the highways
to intoxicated individauls. However, the problem of interpretation
soon arose. Intoxication, within the purview of the statutes, has
been variously defined by the courts in the following manner: "an
appreciable interference with the exercise fby the driver] of ordi-
9. Gonzales, Vance, Helpern and Urmberger, Legal Medicine, Pathology and Toxicology,
at 1083 (2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as Legal Medicine].
10. Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Latw, at 3-12 (Supp. 1959).
11. 1 Mona. 359, 16 Ati. 102 (Pa. 1888).
12. Id. at 103.
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nary care.";" "[when] passions are visibly excited or . . . judgment
impaired by the liquor";" [when the driver] had appreciably lost
normal control of his body and mental facilities.""2
Iii order to eliminate the resulting confusion from many defini-
tions the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordi-
nances incorporated in the Uniform Vehicle Code the following
provision: "it is unlawful and punishable . .. for any person who
is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this State".16 By 1959, forty-
two state legislatures and the District of Columbia had enacted the
model provision into law. 17 Of the remaining states, four use the
term "intoxicated".'" Texas and Nevada legislation includes the
language "intoxicated or under the influence", 2 and the Washington
Code provides "under the influence or affected by".20  Lastly, the
Maine Revised Statutes state "intoxicated or at all under the in-
fluence".2t
An Arizona case appears to be the first reported decision affirming
the use of chemical tests to determine intoxication.2 2 Since that time
court decisions have varied as to the competence of chemical test-
ing, although there now seems to be rather general agreement as to
the admissibility and validity of chemical test results.
The problem confronting those who advocate the general accept-
13. Steinkrause v. Eckstein, 170 Wis. 487, 175 N.W. 988, 990 (1920).
14. State v. Wheelock, 218 Iowa 178, 254 N.W. 313, 318 (1934).
15. Shanahan v. State, 162 Neb. 676, 77 N.W.2d 234, 237 (1956).
16. Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-902 (a) (1956).
17. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 50-5-3 (Cum. Supp. 1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
28-692 (a) (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1027 (1957); Cal. Veh. Code § 23102 (1959);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-30 (1) (Cun. Supp. 1957); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227
(1958); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4111 (a) (Cum. P.P. 1960); Fla. Stat. § 317.20
(1959); Ga. Code Ann. § 68-1625 (a) (1957); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 311-28 (1955);
Idaho Code Ann. § 49-329 (2) (1957); Ill. Rev. Stat. eh. 95% § 144 (a) (1958); Ind.
Ann. Stat. § 47-2001 (b) (1952); Iowa Code Ann. § 321.209 (2) (1949); Kan. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 8-254 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1959); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.520 (2) (1960); Md.
Ann. Code art. 66% § 206 (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90 § 24 (1) (a) (1958);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625 (a) (Supp. 1952); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.121 (1) (a)
(1960); Miss. Code Ann. § 8174 (a) (1942); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 32-2124 (1) (a)
(Cum. Supp. 1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727 (1960); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262.19
(1955); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 39:4-50 (Supp. 1959); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-22-2 (a)
(1953); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138 (1953); N.D. Cent. Code 39-08-01 (2) (1960);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.19 (1954); Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 93 (Supp. 1959); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 483.992 (2) (a) (1959); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75 § 1037 (1959); R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 31-27-2 (a) (Supp. 1960); S.C. Code § 46-343 (Cun. Supp. 1960); S.D.
Code § 44.0302-1 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann 59.1031 (1956); Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (Supp. 1959); Vt. stat. tit. 23, § 1183 (1959); Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-54
(1950); W. Va. Code Ann. § 1721 (331) (a) (1955); Wash. Rev. Code § 46.56.010
(Cum. Supp. 1959); Wis. Stat. Ann § 343.31 (1) (b) (1958); Wyo. Stat. § 31-129 (a)
(1957). The La. Rev. Stat. § 14:98 (Cumr. P.P. 1958) resembles the above quotations
in stating "when intoxicated".
18. Ala. Code tit. '36 § 2 (Supp. 1955); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 564.440 (1949); and N.Y.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (Supp. 1959).
19. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.050 (1) (1959); Tex. Pen. Code, art. 802 (1959).
20. Wash. -Rev. Code § 46.56.010 (Cum. Supp 1959).
21. Me. Rev. Stat., ch. 22 § 150 (Cum. Supp. 1959).
22. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937).
ance of chemical testing was stated in a recent Michigan decision 2
in the following manner:
"The evidentiary situation in this area of the law presents an
odd combination of faith and skepticism. Courts will freely ad-
mit as evidence of intoxication the testimony of untrained ob-
servers that a defendant had difficulty with his speech or walk-
ing. [citation ommitted] At the same time some courts will ada-
mantly set their faces against the testimony of a scientific test
because the results may be jeopardized by an abnormality of
the individual, or the use of faulty techniques or unclean in-
struments in making the test."24
The view that chemical tests should be fully accepted is em-
bodied in an opinion rendered in the case of Toms v. State25 which
states the following:
"[W]e should favor the adoption of scientific methods for
crime detection, where the demonstrated accuracy and reli-
ability has become established and recognized. Justice is truth
in action, and any instrumentality which aids justice in ascer-
tainment of truth, should be embraced without delay ...
We believe, in the light of the foregoing, chemical tests by
experts of body fluids as blood, urine, breath, spinal fluid,
saliva, etc., under varying conditions have been approved as
having gained that scientific recognition of infallibility as to be
admissible in evidence."6
The following skepticism was registered concerning scientific tests
in the case of Frye v. United States:"1
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stage is difficult
to define. Some-where in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."28
Rabinowitch, in challenging the scientific basis of chemical test-
ing asserts that the concentration of blood alcohol and brain alcohol
may not parallel each other because of variation in absorption, dis-
tribution in the body, consumption and elimination through the
kidneys, lungs and pores.29 However it has been held that proof of
23. People v. Miller, 357 Mich. 400, 98 N.W.2d 524 (1959).
24. Id. at 527.
25. 95 Okla. Crim. 60, 239 P.2d 812 (1952).
26. Id. at 821.
27. 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. Id. at 1014.
29. Rabinowitch, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication, 26
Can. B. Rev. 1437 (1948). Dr. Rabinowitch, O.B.E., D.Sc., M.D., C.M., F.R.C.P.(C),
F.A.C.P., is Associate Professor of Medicine and Lecturer in Medical Jurisprudence and
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the alcohol content of a sample of blood is admissible, nothwith-
standing the difference in individuals tolerance to alcohol. 30
Scientific opinion varies from indicating that the test is "accurate
in only 40%o of the cases,3 to indicating that the test is "reasonably
accurate"'" or "affords a safe basis of determining intoxication
where the alcoholic basis is in the higher levels".'- This lack of
unanimity affords a strong basis for critics of chemical testing.
In October 1957, at the annual meeting of the Committee on Test
for Intoxcation of the National Safety Council, the Uniform Chemi-
cal Test for Intoxication Act was approved. This committee, con-
sisting of scientists, doctors, judges, lawyers and law enforcement
officers further recommended that the Act be adopted by the vari-
ous state legislatures.
A portion of the Act is concerned with degrees of alcoholic intox-
ication. This has been the subject of discussion and debate for
many years. It was finally decided that the degrees of alcoholic
intoxication would be 'presumed' as follows: (a) 0.5% or less -
not under the influence of intoxicating liquor" (b) 0.5% to 0.15%o
- "[no] presumption that the defendant was or was not under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered
with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant" (c) over 0.15% -"presumed that the de-
fendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor"."
The following excerpt reflects the opinion of many now calling
for a downward revision of the presumed percentages:
"The Uniform Act has required a rather high percentage of
alcohol in the blood to create prima facie evidence of intoxica-
tion. The concentration of 15 hundreths of one per cent is
much higher than many scientists consider required to place
any person under the influence of alcohol with judgment im-
paired, and control of faculties lost. The Uniform Act has
taken this percentage because it exists in all present American
legislation and because it eliminates any conceivable question
of tolerance of different individuals. The figure of 12 hundreths
of one percent would more nearly accord with modern scien-
tific opinion.""
Toxicology at McGill University, Montreal; Director, Institute for Special Research and Cell
Metabolism, The Montreal General Hospital.
30. Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Wis. 394, 291 N.W. 384 (1940).
31. Gardner, Breath Tests for Alcohol: A Sampling Study of Mechanical Evidence, 31
Texas Law Rev. 289, 300 (1952).
32. LeTourneau, Chemical Tests in Alcoholic Intoxication, 28 Can. B. Rev. 858, 866,
(1950).
33. Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspccts of the Blood Test to Determine In-
toxication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 267 (1939).
34. Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication Act § 7.
35. 9 U.L.A., at 42 (Cum. Supp. 1960).
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This legislation has been adopted by the legislatures of nearly
one-third of the states,36 and while many consider it inadequate for
controlling those whose intoxication ranges between 0.05 per cent
and 0.15 per cent, it is an effective measure of the more serious
cases and will further suffice until downward revision can be made.
The Committee on Medicolegal Problems of the American Medi-
cal Association reports that chemical tests for alcohol concentra-
tion have been in use for nearly 100 years. They further report that
their use to determine intoxication has been employed for over 50
years.37
In 1914, Widmark, a Swedish scientist proposed that chemistry
aid in diagnosing inebriation. Chemical tests were accepted in evi-
dence in 1930 in Sweden and in 1934 a law was passed making the
tests compulsory.311 In 1936, upon order of the German Interior
Ministry, the Widmark method of blood analysis were ordered in
connection with traffic accident cases.36
Today chemical tests for intoxcation have been accepted in Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Canada, Czeckoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land and the United States.40 In an effort to increase the use of
chemical tests and induce legislation allowing chemical testing in
the United States, the following organizations have recommended
their use: The American Medical Association, National Safety
Council, International Association of Chiefs of Police, American Bar
36. Sixteen states have nearly approximated the provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Code:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-692 (b) (1956); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-30.(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1957); Ga. Code Ann. § 68-1625 (b) (1957); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 311-29 (1955);
Idaho Code Ann. § 49-1102 (b) (1957); Ill. Rev. Stat. § 144 (b) (1958); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 189.520 (4) (1960); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 32-2142 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1959);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727.01 (1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.055 (1) (1959); S.C. Code §
46-344 (1952); S.D. Code § 44.0302-1 (Supp. 1960); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp.
1959); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 31-129 (b) (1957).
In the following statutes the test result constitutes prima facie evidence rather than a
presumption: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507 (Cum. P.P. 1960); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 47-
2003 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1960'); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 100 (a) (3) (Supp .1959);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.121(2) (1960); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262:20 (1955); N.Y.
Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192 (1960); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 483.630 (5) (1959); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 1721(331a) (Cum. Supp. 1960); Wis. Stat. § 325.235 (1) (1958). The Me.
Rev. Stat. ch. 22, § 150 (Cum. Supp. 1959) raises the lower presumptive- level from
0.05 per cent to 0.07 per cent and differs only in that respect.
Other statutes differ variously. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1031.1 (1957) gives chemical
test evidence neither prima facie nor presumptive effect. Kan. Gen. State Ann. § 8-1005
(Supp. 1959) state that any percentage of alcohol concentration under 0.15, a person is
presumed to be not under the influence. On the other hand Tenn. Code Ann. § 59.1033
(1955) presumes that only after the alcohol content reaches 0.15 per cent is one presumed
under the influence. Vt. Stat. § 1189 (Supp. 1959) states conclusively that one is not in-
toxicated if alcohol concentration is 0.05 per cent or less.
37. Committee on Medicologal Problems, American Medical Association, Chemical Tests
For Intoxication Manual 4 (1959).
38. See Slough and Wilson, Chemical Testing For Intoxication, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 673,
675 (1960).
39. See 107 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2145 (1936).
40. See Slough and Wilson, supra note 37, at 5.
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Association, American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators,
The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances,
The Presidents Highway Safety Conference, American Automobile
Association, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Licensed
Beverage Industries.4
B. THE BODY'S PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO ALCOHOL
In order to establish a sound basis for our consideration of chemi-
cal testing it is necessary to investigate the chemical reaction of the
body to alcohol. Very shortly after the ingestion of alcohol into the
stomach, usually 2 to 10 minutes later, it begins appearing in the
blood stream. It's passage is from the stomach, then to the intestine
and through the intestinal wall and directly into the bloodstream.
If the drinker imbibes of a sufficient amount it cannot be eliminated
quickly enough by the body and there is a consequent piling up of
alcohol in the bloodstream. The blood stream carries the excess
alcohol to all parts of the body. Drunkeness results when the nerve
cells receive this alcohol as it interferes with the passage of regular
nerve impulses." Thus, due to this distribution, chemical testing
is made possible as the alcohol is distributed equally to the brain,
liver, kidneys, muscles and every part of the body which contains
water.4 3 Therefore, with the passage of nerve impulses impaired,
one experiences a lessening of normal reaction time, blurred vision,
the traditional feeling of well-being and the subsequent care-free
attitude toward the complex problems of modern highway travel.
II. CHEMICAL TESTS
A. THE BLOOD TEST
The blood test is considered the most reliable method of determ-
ining the amount of alcohol in one's body. Certain procedures
should be strictly followed by all persons involved in taking or pro-
cessing the sample. Initially, the subject should be notified that he
does not have to consent to the test if be does not desire to do so. It
should be further stated that a refusal to do so will result in the
loss of his driving privileges for a period of six months. Upon re-
ceiving the necessary consent, the subject's arm should be cleaned
41. Id. at 4.
42. Legal Medicine, supra note 9, at 1094.
43. See People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492, 501 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
1954).
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with a non-alcohol solution. The use of alcohol as a cleansing agent
may adulterate the test and result in either an unfairly high reading
or refusal of the court to allow its admission into evidence. The
syringe used in the withdrawal should be thoroughly cleansed in
pure distilled water as should all glassware and instruments used in
the course of the test. After the sample is withdrawn from the sub-
ject it should be placed in a sterile container, sealed, and properly
labelled with the subject's name and any other pertinent medical
information. If the sample is to be stored pending delivery to a
laboratory it should be refrigerated. Upon delivery of the specimen
to the laboratory, it should be properly marked and a receipt given
the delivering officer.
The test is conducted in the following manner: 20 cubic centi-
meters of saturated picric acid solution are introduced into a distil-
ling flask, one cubic centimeter of the sample to be analyzed added
along with a few chips of porcelain to prevent lumping. The distil-
ling flask is connected to a glass condenser which is so made that
the condenser fits into the distilling glass like a ground glass stop-
per into a bottle. Ten cubic centimeters of standard dichromate
solution (2.188 g. of potassium dichromate made up to 1000 c.c.
with distilled water) equivalent to 0.5 mg. of alcohol is added to
the receiving flask. About 10 c.c. of distillate is obtained, 20 c.c.
of sulphuric acid is added and the mixture is allowed to stand for
about 10 minutes. A titration solution containing ferrous sulphate,
sulphuric acid and a small amount of mthyl orange is added from a
burrette with constant stirring until the distillate shows an excess
of the methyl orange. The cubic centimeters of the ferrous sulphate
solution is noted. A blank titration is done on exactly 10 c.c. of the
standard bichromate solution with sulphuric acid added and this
result is also noted. The calculation: 10 times the distillate titration
in cubic centimeters is divided by the blank titration and the result
subtracted from 10; the figure obtained multiplied by 50 gives the
mg. percent of alcohol. The composition of the titration solution is
as follows: Three stock solutions are prepared, (a) ferrous sulfate
crystals, 50 mg. dissolved in about 150 c.c. of water, 30 c.c. of sul-
phuric acid added and the volume made to 250 c.c.; (b) sulfuric
acid 50% by volume, and (c) 0.1% methyl orange in 0.1% sodium
hydrate solution; mixed before using in these proportions - (a) 60
c.c. (b) 40 c.c. and (c) 2 c.c.
The distillation, oxidation and titration are repeated on a second
1 c.c. sample of the specimen. The calculated results should check
1961] Noi-s
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within 5 mg. % for lower values and 10 mg. % for higher values.
Otherwise a third test should be made. 4
Notes taken during the analysis and calculations of the alcohol
content should be preserved. The container and what is left of the
specimen may be returned to the officer and a receipt obtained, or
it may be kept under lock and key in the laboratory by the analyst
until the trial, and personally delivered to the prosecuting attorney.
Other methods used in analyzing blood specimens for alcohol in-
clude Heise's test,4 5 the Widmark method 6  and the Nicloux
method, 47 any of which gives accurate reading of the amount of
blood alcohol present in the suspect's body.
B. THE SALIVA, URINE AND CEREBRO-SPINAL FLUID TESTS
The chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of urine
operates on the scientific presumption that the alcoholic content of
the urine is an accurate measure of the alcoholic content of the
blood.
A definite asset in the use of the urinalysis is that it may be ad-
ministered by anyone without extensive training or scientific back-
ground. It is only necessary that the container in which the sample
is taken be free from contamination and that the specimen be
properly sealed and transported to the laboratory. Upon arrival
at the laboratory the specimen is distilled over a specific amount
of potassium dichromate. The alcohol, if any is present in the speci-
men, reacts with the chemical. Upon completion of this process
the amount of potassium dichromate used is measured, which
should reflect the amount of alcohol present in the specimen.
48
44. Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine In-
toxication, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191 (1939). While various methods are available for blood
analysis, the quoted method is the one used in the University of Iowa Hospital. 24 Iowa
L. Rev. 210, 211.
45. "After distillation of the urine or blood, diluted with a picric-tartaric solution to
prevent frothing, the alcohol in a portion of the distillate is oxydized with potassium di-
chromate and sulphuric acid. This changes the color in the solution from yellow to blue.
The percentage of alcohol is obtained by matching the resulting co'or with the color-
standard tubes prepared from known concentrations of alcohol. This test is used exten-
sively in this country". Id. at 211.
46. Two to four drops of blood are drawn from the ear lobe or finger tip, after skin
puncture, wth specially prepared glass tubes. Theso tubes are weighed, the blood dis-
charged into a glass spoon attachment to a glass stoppered flask containing a measured
amount of a bicbromate-sulphuric acid mixture, the emptied blood container again weighed
to obtain the amount of blood by difference. The flask and the blank control are placed
in an oven at 70* centigarde. The water and alcohol vapor are absorbed by the oxidyzing
mixture, the blood sample being completely dried. The unchanged bichromate is estimated
idometrically, the difference between the values of the control and the blood sample flask
being equivalent to the alcohol in the sample. The Widmark method is used especially
in Germany and the Scandinavian countries and Denmark. Id. at 211, 212.
47. This method calls for a distillation of the blood or urine diluted with a picric acid
solution, biebromate oxidation, the addition of an excess measured amount of a standard
ferrous sulphate solution which reduces the unused bichromate; the latter is estimated by
titration with standard potassium permanganate. The Nicloux method is used principally
in France, Switzerland and Belgimn. Id. at 212.
48. See Note, 29 Conn. B.J. 147, 152, 153 (1955).
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Care should be exercised in some areas of the urinalysis. First
of all a diabetic should be specially checked to ascertain whether
the urine contains acetone. Acetone reacts somewhat like alcohol
and will cause an unfairly high reading if undetected. Another area
where an unfair reading may occur is concerned with the time at
when the sample is taken. Alcohol accumulates in varying amounts
in the bladder depending upon the time of consumption or the
amount consumed. Thus, a urinalysis administered a short time
after consumption would indicate a very low quantity of alcohol, if
any.
The saliva test merits some consideration but for obvious reasons
it may be impractical in some instances. Often the mental anxiety
experienced by one apprehended for driving will cause the suspect's
mouth to become dry, making the sampling impossible. Great cau-
tion must be exercised in the saliva test to insure that mouth alcohol
is not present due to recent drinking or regurgitation. The officer
taking the sample should wait at least 15 minutes after apprehen-
sion of the suspect to insure that all mouth alcohol is washed away.
Chemical testing for the alcohol content of cerebro spinal fluid
has and may be used. However, its use should probably be restrict-
ed to autopsies as surgical conditions are necessary when the spinal
puncture is made. There are dangers inherent in this approach and
'most suspects would be wary of this method of sampling.
C. BREATH TESTS
Four scientific devices have been developed to measure the alco-
hol content of breathed air. They include the Drunkometer,4" the
Alcometer, s° the Breathalyzer51 and the Intoximeter. 2  These de-
49. Developed by Dr. R. N. Harger, Professor of Biochemistry and Toxicology at the
School of Medicine, Indiana University. Doctor Harger has written extensively on this sub-
ject and is a noted authority on the subject of chemical testing.
50. Developed by L. A. Greenburg and F. W. Keator of Yale University, "In the Al-
cometer test . . . the subject is required to blow into a collection chamber which samples
a fixed (30 c.c.) measure of expired air. The sample is held in the tube at a constant
temperature in order to avoid condensation of moisture. The sample of air is then blown
into a reaction chamber which contains iodine pentoxide as an oxydizing agent. When al-
cohol reduces the pentoxide, this causes free iodine to be liberated. All of the iodine thus
released is then bubbled through a fortified solution of starch and potassium iodide con-
tained in the colormeter test tube. A blue color is here produced, the intensity of which
is proportional to the amount of free iodine present: the more iodine present, the darker
the blue will appear. This is measured by means of a photo-electric cell. As the intensity
of the blue changes, it is recorded on the Alcometer scale, calibrated in per cent of alcohol
in the suspect's blood. This test avoids any assumption as does the Drunkometer concerning
the relationship between blood alcohol and alcohol in the lung air." 29 Conn. B.J. 147, 154
(1955).
51. The Breathalyzer is a self-contained device, weighing approximately eighteen pounds.
It is contained in an aluminum carrying case which measures 9 inches by 10 inches by
9 inches. The device is electrically operated either from 110 volt, 60 cycle circuits or on
a six or twelve volt storage battery.
For it's operation the subject blows into a mouthpiece. A piston device settles to a
predetermined position and is held in that position by a magnet. In this way 52 c.c. of
breath air is held in the cylinder. The operator then allows the trapped air to filter into an
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vices are commercially manufactured and may be purchased by any
law enforcement agency.
In speaking of the practical application of the Breathalyzer, Bork-
enstein and Somth point out some obvious advantages of the various
breath testing devices:"
"The stability of the instrument and the close control pos-
sible in the measurement have assisted in its wide acceptance
in the United States, Switzerland, England, Sweden and Aus-
tralia. With this instrument as with other breath testng de-
vices, the concentration of alcohol in the blood of a driver sus-
pected of being 'under the influence' can be determined quick-
ly. When this concentration is high it becomes part of the evi-
dence in the case. When the concentration is low (below
0.05%7 ), the driver can be relieved of suspicion. Moreover, the
test will always be valuable protection for the person who is ill,
and whose intoxicated behaviour is not attributable to alco-holJ."54
These devices measure the amount of alcohol in the alveolar air. 5
It is claimed that the alcohol in the blood will pass into the alveolar
air and reach a state of equilibrium so that the ratio of alcohol in
the blood to the alveolar air will be constant.5"
It will be sufficient, for our purposes, to investigate the scientific
principle of but one of these instruments: the Harger Drunko-
meter.57 -For its operation, a sampe of the suspects breath is blowninto a previously unused balloon. This balloon is then attached to
alcohol sensitive solution (3 millilitres of 0.025 per cent potassium dichromate in 50%
sulphuric acid). The solution absorbs the alcohol from the breath and oxidyzes it according
to a definite chemical relationship. As this reaction progresses, the yellow color of the
solution fades in proportion to the amount of alcohol oxidized. The operator then records
the decrease in yellow color that occurs in the oxidized solution. The actual measurement
is done by a series of light filters and photo-electric cells. The degree of color change is
measured on a dial calibrated in per cent of alcohol in the blood. This instrument is not
appreciably affected by variance in temperature (plus or minus 10") nor in lapse in time
of reading. Other chemicals (wood alcohol,- ether or pareldehyde) which would appreci-
ably affect the reading are not usually found on the average individual. Smith & Lucas,
Breath Tests For Alcohol, reprinted from The Criminal Law Quarterly, Volume 1, Number
1, pp. 26-30.
52. Developed by Dr. G. C. Forrester, It's scientific principle is nearly the same as that
of the Drunkometer except that it substitutes Magnesium Perchlorate instead of Potassium
Permanganate solution used in the Drunkometer. Two models, the Photo-electric and an
small portable are available.
53. See Pamphlet, The Breathalyzer and It's Application, by R. F. Borkenstein, B.A.,
Chairman, Department of Police Administration, Indiana University, and H. W. Smith,
Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Pharmacology, University of Toronto; Director, Attorney Gen-
eral's Laboratory, Toronto. Ontario.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Alveolar air is that air drawn from deep in the lungs where it comes in contact
with the small blood vessels.
56. For a criticism of the various chemical tests, see generally Rabinowitch, Medicolegal
Aspects of Chemical Tests of Intoxication, 39 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 225 passim (1948), to
which Drs. Harger and Meuhlberger reply in Medicol6gal Aspects of Chemical Tests For
Intoxication-Comments on Dr. 1. M. Rabinowitch's Paper, 39 J. Crim. L., C.&S.P. 402
passim (1948).
57. For a thoroughly complete and illuminating discussion of the Hanger Drunkometer,
see People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Ct. Spec..Sess. 1954).
a glass inlet tube which allows the breath to pass into a reagent
containing a solution of potassium permanganate at 1/20th its nor-
mal strength, 56% sulphuric acid and 46% distilled water, by
weight.
The solution in this reagent is purple in color and the reagent is
situated between two sealed comparison tubes containing different
colored solutions. As the breath sample passes through the reagent
the sulphuric acid catches the alcohol and causes a color change in
the solution. The end point of this color change is reached when
0.169 milligrams of alcohol pass through the solution and cause the
purple solution to attain a shade between the colors in the two
comparison tubes.
The amount of breath needed to attain this 0.169 milligrams of
alcohol always varies according to the amount of alcohol in the
blood and the breath. The portion of breath needed to reach the
end point color is then passed into a partitioned container called a
Gasometer and displaces water in the upper portion of the tube to
a lower, calibrated portion. The more intoxicated a person, the
more rapidly the alcohol is caught and therefore a smaller portion
of air reaches the Gasometer. Through the use of a formula which
equates centimeters of expired breath to a centimeter of alcohol
concentration in the blood, one can determine the ratio of alcohol in
the breath to that of alcohol in the blood.
A second test is taken whereby the breath is passed through a
tube containing magnesium perchlorate which removes the breath
moisture. It passes then through a tube containing a substances of
fused potassium hydroxide on particles of asbestos which catches
all carbon dioxide in the breath. When the reaction tube removes
0.169 milligrams of alcohol the second tube containing the asbestos
is removed and re-weighed. On the basis of a formula stating that
3200 centimeters of ordinary expired breath or 2100 cubic centi-
meters of deep lung breath contain, 190 milligrams of carbon diox-
ide, the amount of breath used is determined.
Through the use of the two tests a definite amount of alcohol is
measured and the amount of breath necessary to furnish this alcohol
is also measured. From these amounts one may calculate the per-
cent of alcohol in the blood.
With the exception of one notable decision," the scientific relia-
58. People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949) (wherein the Michigan
Supreme Court accepted the testimony of five physicians as expert witnesses for the de-
fense) pointed out that the basis of defendant's expert testimony was that "'most of the
medical profession considered the method of testing unreliable . . . based on articles
written by authors critical of procedures employed in the drunkometer test"; see Slough &
Wilson, Chemical Testing For IntoxicatioA,.44 Mirn. L. Rev. 673, 680 n. 18 (1960).
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bility of the various breath testing devices has been generally ac-
cepted by the courts.5 9 However, the courts will not take judicial
notice of the reliability of such tests;60 thus the prosecution must
call an expert witness qualified to testify as to the scientific reli-
ability of the device.0 ' If said witness was not the operator, it is
also necessary that the person actually taking the test be able to
prove his qualifications in properly administering the test.6 2
Testimony offered in establishing the reliability of the device goes
to the weight of the results given rather than to their admissibility.6"
Therefore, it is incumbent upon prosecutors and law enforcement
personnel to become especially well acquainted with their technical
ramifications and the scientific theories necessary to their develop-
ment and use.
Some jurisdictions require corroborating evidence in addition to
the results of the scientific tests. A Wsconsin case held that the
odor of alcohol on the drivers breath and his manner of driving,
witnessed by the officer, constituted sufficient corroborating evi-
dence.6 4
The fact that chemical test results are admissible in the courts as
valid evidence can hardly be disputed. Therefore, implementing
legislation is generally not necessary, it being only incumbent to
abide strictly by the rules of evidence. Statutory interpretation has
at least required strict conformity with the statute in some jurisdic-
tions, while others may generally be considered permissive in
nature.65 Chemical test legislation, in the main, requires that the
prosecution prove the scientific reliability of the device. North Da-
kota's Implied Consent Statute recognizes the scientific basis of the
59. State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P.2d 893 (1954); State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 93,
259 P.2d 261 (1953); People v. Bobczyk, 343 11. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951);
Willennar v. State, 228 Ind. 248, 91 N.E.2d 178 (1950); People v. Coppock, 206 Misc.
89, 133 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954); People v. Spears, 201 Misc. 666, 114
N.Y.S.2d 869 (1952); Lombness v. State, 243 P.2d 389, (Okla. Crim. 1952); Toms v.
State, 239' P.2d 812 (Okla. Crim. 1952); Guenther v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 519, 221
S.W.2d 780 (1949); Omohundro v. Arlington County, 194 Va. 773, 75 S.E.2d 496 (1953).
60. State v. Williams, 245 Iowa 401, 62 N.W.2d 241 (1954); Fortune v. State, 197
Tenn. 691, 277 S.W.2d 381 (1955); People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322
(1949). Contra, Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Ore. 486, 163 P.2d 936 (1945), holding that the
test is scientifically established; see Stacy v. State, 228 Ark. 260, 306 S.W.2d 852 (1957);
State v. Libby, 153 Me. 1, 133 A.2d 877 (1957); State v. Moore, 245 N.C. 158, 95
S.E.2d 548 (1956); State v. McQuilkin, 113 Utah 268, 193 P.2d 433 (1948).
61. North Dakota's implied consent law recognizes "the results of the Harger Drunko-
meter or other similar devices" when received in evidence. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-07(5)
(1960).
62. See Fortune v. State, 197 Tenn. 691, 277 S.W.2d 381, 384 (1955) (wherein the
qualifications of the operator are distinguished from that of an expert witness).
63. State v. Olixas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P.2d 893 (1954); accord, McKay v. State, 155
Tex. trim. 416, 253 S.W.2d 173 (1951).
64. Schwartz v. Schneuringer, 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W.2d 756, 760 (1955).
65. State v. Resler, 262 Wis. 285, 55 N.W.2d 35 (1952); accord, Schutt v. MacDuff,
205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1954); Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d
943 (1959).
Harger Drunkometer "and other similar devices"." Here the ope-
rator need only prove that the test was "fairly administered".
Generally, the admissibility of evidence of the results of breath
testing devices lies within the dscretion of the trial judge." In ad-
rIitting expert testimony, the court must determine that experts have
some special, as well as practical, knowledge of the subject upon
which he is testifying. The court does not rule upon the trustworthi-
ness of his testimony as this is left to the jury.68 These results should
not be considered as conclusive but should be considered with other
circumstances of the case by the jury. 9
III. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. CUSTODY AND PRESERVATION
In any prosecution involving chemical testing it is incumbent
upon the party relying upon the evidence of such test to prove the
identity, preservation, and proper custody of the samples taken. This
proof constitutes the "chain of evidence". An Iowa court 7 0 describ-
ing this process held that "it is necessary to establish a complete
chain of evidence, tracing the possession of the exhibit from the
defendant to the first custodian, and . . . if one link in the chain is
entirely missing, the exhibit cannot be introduced.."' Generally, it
must be proved that the sample was taken from the defendant, that
the sample was properly preserved, and that it was correctly labeled
and identified. 72 Where necessary, it must be shown that the sample
was properly transported and delivered and finally that the sample
taken is the sample being introduced in court.7 1
The identity of the person from whom the sample was taken is
provable by direct testimony. 'It is most desirable to have the testi-
mony of the person actually taking the test, however, a Texas
court 74 held a blood specimen properly identified where a police
officer testified as to his presence at the time of the sampling, not-
withstanding the failure of the doctor to testify.
66. See statute cited at note 61 supra.
67. Fortune v. State, 197 Tenn. 691, 277 S.W.2d 381 (1955).
68. Accord, Moon v. State, 146 Tenn. 319, 242 S.W. 39 (1922).
69. See Sheperd v. State, 300 Pac. 421 (Okla. Crim. 1931).
70. Joyner v. Unterbach, 196 Iowa 1040, 195 N.W. 594 (1923).
71. Id. at 595.
72. Piester v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 436, 277 S.W.2d 723 (1955); see State v. Brezina,
45 N.J. Super. 596, 133 A.2d 366 (1957), where the court held that test results were
inadmissible because prosecution failed to show that chemicals were properly compounded
and in good condition.
73. Abego v. State, 157 Tex. Cim. 264, 248 S.W.2d 490 (1952); see MeAlliste v.
State, 159 Tex. Crim. 57, 261 S.W.2d 332 (1953); Gilderbloom v. State, 160 Tex. Crim.
471, 272 S.W.2d 106 (1954).
74. Mora v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 321, 263 S.W.2d 787 (1954).
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In considering whether the specimen has been adequately pre-
served and has remained in the proper custody, two factors arose:
(1) was the specimen properly secured to prevent tampering or
contamination and (2) was the packaging or container sufficient in
view of the necessity to prevent tampering or contamination? The
testimony on this subject should include the type of container em-
ployed 7 5 the safekeeping of the sample,- and whether anyone had
an opportunity to tamper with, or disturb the sample.
77
It has been held that the prosecution's failure to provide evidence
of proper custody may be obviated by the direct testimony of an in-
dividual who will state that he recognizes the sample because of
distinguishing characteristics or marks previously observed. How-
ever, this does not imply that the specimen is in the same condition
when identified as when first observed.s
The necessity of proper labeling of chemical test specimens is
obvious. Each sample, after being placel in a sealed container,
should be marked so that it is completely distinguishable from other
samples in possession. The inability to positively identify a sample
in the courtroom is usually considered a fatal break in the chain of
evidence.7 A Virginia decision" held that where evidence failed to
show that blood sample taken from defendant was properly label-
led and that only evidence was to the effect that blood from accused
was analyzed the day following the taking, that the proof was in-
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the sample ana-
lyzed was the sample extracted from the defendant.
A majorty of the law enforcement agencies are faced with the
problem of transporting a specimen from the place where the sample
was taken to the laboratory for analysis. The utmost care must be
exercised to insure that the transportation of the specimen consti-
tutes a continuous transaction. The courts demand that persons
handling the specimen be able to show, in direct testimony, that the
sample remained secure from tampering, contamination and con-
fusion with other samples. An Iowa case held that where a blood
sample taken from defendant was properly mailed and addressed
75. State v. Thompson, 132 Mo. 301, 34 S.W. 31 (1896).
76. Piester v. State, stipra note 72.
77. People v. Bowers, 2 Cal.Unrep. 878, 18 Par. 660, 666 (1888). It was held, by
way of dicta, in Hershiser v. Chicago, B. Q. Ry., 102 Neb. 820, 170 N.W. 177 (1918),
that identity is sufficiently shown where probability of tampering is negatived, is best shown
by proving that the specimen was untouched except by the expert who made the analysis,
but may be proved in spite of the possibility of the substitution of another specimen. See
also People v. Herman, 8 Misc.2d 991, 166 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1957).
78. State v. Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S.W.2d 74 (1933).
79. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Com., 78 Cal.App.2d
493. 178 P.2d 40 (1947).
80. Newton v. Richmond, 198 Va. 869, 96 S.E.2d 775 (1957).
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to the State Hygenic Laboratory it would be presumed that it was
properly delivered. " However, a District of Columbia decision held
that where the witness testified as to taking the specimen, label-
ling it and delivering it to a laboratory for analysis and the subse-
quent testimony of the expert witness making the analysis and his
identification of the sample without ideintification by the deliveror
constituted a missing link in the chain of evidence .12
An excellent Iowa decision, State v. Werling,83 shows what would
be the correct method of handling a blood specimen. Here, in a
drunk driving prosecution, a physician testified as to taking a speci-
men from defendant's body and giving it to a police officer, X; X
testified that the physician took the sample in his presence, put it in
a sealed container, labeled the container with defendant's name and
gave him the container. X further testified that he kept the speci-
men overnight and gave it to another policeman, Y, the following
day. Y then testified that he had received the specimen from X,
that he delivered the specimen to a specific hospital where he gave
it to a medical technician, Z. Z testified that she received the speci-
men from policeman Y, opened it and delivered it to a Doctor. Z
then testified that she proceeded to make the analysis under the
Doctor's supervision.
The question of the necessity of producing the specimen in court
arises at this point. There is a strong inference that the specimen,
or at least part of it, properly packaged and labeled should be pro-
duced in court as absolute proof of security.8 4 However, where the
specimen has been completely destroyed as a result of normal labo-
ratory procedures it has been held that absolute production is not
necessary.8" Generally, failure to produce the specimen, if not fatal
to the test, raises a strong presumption that the evidence is insuf-
ficient.86
B. THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
It is nct infrequent that a person charged with intoxication under
the terms of the various statutes has availed himself or has been
committed to medical care. This most often occurs in the case of
automobile accidents where defendant is subsequently involved in
civil or crim'nnal litigation resulting from the mishap.
Naturally, where defendant has received medical aid, most plain-
81. State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940).
82. Novak v. District of Columbia, supra note 82.
83. 234 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W.2d 318 (1944).
84. See Novak v. District of Columbia, supra note 82.
85. State v. Romo, 6 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947).
86. See Nichols v. McCoy, 106 Cal. App. 2d 661, 235 P.2d 412 (1951).
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tiffs and prosecutors will attempt to introduce the doctor's testimony
as to defendant's condition. The natural reaction to these attempts
is defendant's claim that such testimony violates the physician-
patient privilege accorded by statute in many jurisdictions. North
Dakota, not unlike many other jurisdictions has enacted such a
statute:
"A physician or surgeon, without the consent of his patient,
cannot be examined as to any information acquired in attend-
ing the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe
or act for the patient.""T
At common law the existence of privileged communication as be-
tween physician and patient was unknown,8 It follows that states
not having enacted such statutes do not recognize the privilege.8"
In Perry v. Hannagan,0 a Michigan decision, in which defend-
ant's doctor testified as to the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath,
the court held that the doctor was treating the patient for cuts and
bruises and not for intoxication and could therefore testify as to
what he had observed apart from the treatment of the injuries. On
the other hand, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in the case of Free-
burg v. State,1 cited as controlling an opinion rendered in the case
of Smart v. Kansas City,9 2 a Missouri decision:
"We have distinctly held in such a case that the communica-
tion to the physician's sense of sight is within the statute, and as
much as if it had been oral and reached his ear.... The mean-
ing of this section is not veiled in doubt. It disqualifies the
physicians and surgeons from testifying to any information ac-
quired by them while attending their patients in a professional
capacity." 3
Thus within the purview of the Missouri decision, any observa-
tions made by a physician during treatment of his patient for any
cause, falls within the terms of the statute.
A recent Indiana decision announced that a statute necessitated
the exclusion of evidence of the result of a blood test where the ac-
cused's physician had treated the defendant for injuries received.9"
In view of the uncertainties of the decisions in many of the juris-
dictions it seems the best policy to insure that the specimen taken
at the time of the analysis be taken by a technician other than the
87. N.D. Cent. Code § 31-01-06 (3) (1962).
88. In re Albert Lindley Lee -Memorial Hospital, 115 F.Supp. 643, 645 (N.D.N.Y.
1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953).
89. Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679, 4 So.2d 311, 313 (1941).
90. 257 Mich. 120, 241 N.W. 232 (1932).
91. 92 Neb. 346, 138 N.W. 143 (1912).
92. 208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709 (1907).
93. Freeburg v. State, supra note 91, at 144.
94. Adel v. State, 154 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. 1958).
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physician or surgeon treating the subject for injuries. This would
of necessity preclude the privilege from arising at the time of the
prosecution.
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER EVIDENCE
Often memoranda, business, and official records are used to re-
fresh a witness's memory or are referred to for data needed in the
prosecution of a case wherein the testing of a chemical specimen is
being considered.
It has been held that where a memorandum is used as the basis
for a witness's testimony, the memorandum is only secondary evi-
dence of the fact for which it speaks, the primary evidence being
the witness's own knowledge95 It then follows that where a witness
had no prior knowledge, a memorandum on the subject is inadmis-
sible in evidence. Thus, the identity of a person from whom a blood
sample has been taken can only be proved positively by the person
actually taking the test.96
Hospital or laboratory business records may sometimes form the
basis for a witness's testimony. The common law rule97 was that
these records were generally inadmissible unless testimony from the
person subscribing the data was available. However, THE UNI-
FORM BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT has been
adopted in North Dakota which reads:
"A record of an act, condition, or event shall be competent
evidence, in so far as relevant, if:
1. The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation;
2. It was made in the regular course of business, at or near
the time of the act, condition or event; and
3. The sources of information and the method and time of
preparation, in the opinion of the court, were such as to just-
fy its admission.
For the purpose of this section, the term "business" shall in-
clude every kind of business, profession, whether carried on for
profit or not.' 's8
A North Dakota case, State v. Ramstad,- held that this statute
is not restricted to civil suits but is equally applicable in criminal
95. Dr. R. D. Eaton Chemical Co. v. Doherty, 31 N.D. 175, 153 N.W. 966 (1915);
see Weigel v. Powers Elevator Co., 49 N.D. 869, 194 N.W. 113 (1923).
96. Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Ore. 486. 163 P.2d. 936 (1945).
97. This rule includes the 'shopbook rule' which admits only the account books of a
party to a cause or proceeding, and the 'regular entries' rule by which entries or memo-
randa made by third parties in the regular course of business are admissible in evidence.
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1518 (3d ed. 1940).
98. N.D. Cent. Code § 31-08-01 (1960).
99. 87 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1958).
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actions. With the aid of this liberally construed statute the courts
have little difficulty in admitting fully, any amount of business rec-
ords available which are pertinent to the cause. 100
Public documents, official records and writings are considered in
a different light than ordinary business records and memoranda.
Where there is a duty to record official doings, the record thus kept
is admissible in evidence.' 0 ' The North Dakota statute on this sub-
ject reads as follows:
"Entries in public or other official books or records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of this state, or
by another person in the performance of a duty specially en-
joined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein."2 01
It is obvious from the foregoing material that the most meticulous
attention be given to the details involved in presenting evidentiary
material as the rules of evidence related to chemical testing are
often diverse and complicated.
IV. QUALIFICATIONS NECESSARY TO ADMINISTER
THE TESTS
The North Dakota Code specifically states which individuals are
qualified to withdraw blood in chemical tests for intoxication. The
statute provides:
"Only a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist or reg-
istered nurse acting at the request of a law enforcement officer
may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alco-
holic content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the tak-
ing of breath, saliva or urine specimens .... "J103
Each type of chemical test for intoxication has involved peculi-
arities. It is obvious that the policeman-operator need not have
the qualifications of the college trained chemist who interprets the
test. The policeman must however be qualified to fairly administer
100. See Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1955), and
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 712 (N.D. 1956), where it was
held that the admission or exclusion of records under the statute should not be reversed in
the absenec of manifest abuse of discretion and that the statute should be liberally con-
strued.
101. See Smith v. Mott, 100 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1958), where it was held that a medical
examiner's report was admissible under public record exception to hearsay rule. See also 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 1639 (3d ed. 1940).
102. N.D. Cent. Code § 31-09-08 (1960). See generally Title 31-09, of the N.D. Cent.
Code for statutory material concerning other types of public documents or writings.
103. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-02 (1960). Other implied consent statutes distinguish
as to who may withdraw a blood specimen in the following manner: Idaho (physician
or registered nurse); Kansas (physician or qualified medical technician); New York (phy-
sician only); South Dakota (physician, laboratory technician, medical technician, or medi-
cal technologist); Utah (physician or laboratory technician); Vermont (physician only);
Nebraska (physician, registered nurse, or registered laboratory technician).
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and completely conduct the examination of any suspect brcught
before him.1"4
It is necessary that the qualification of the test operator be pre-
sented prior to the introduction of his findings. The acceptance of
an operator's credentials, or reliability lies largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court.1"' It is extremely important that a person
operating one of the chemical testing devices be trained in the
fundamentals of the machine. It is not necessary that he under-
stand the scientific principles behind the device, but he should be
able to clearly outline the methods and procedures used in making
the test.
Every police unit using the chemical testing devices should have
the services of a qualified chemist or laboratory technician to inter-
pret the results of chemical tests. This expert will be able to com-
petently testify as to the scientific basis, methods and results of the
test and tie in the testimony of the operator.
Illustrative of the aforementioned principles are the following
cases. In State v. Gagnon,"' a police operator administered the test
and subsequently testified as to the details of the test and as to the
numerical result received, which was stated as "0.21". His testimony
as to his qualifications was that he was a high school graduate with
no chemistry background and no laboratory training in evaluating
the tests. His testimony was followed by that of a pathologist and
research specialist who testified as to the qualifications of the ope-
rator, the scientific reliability of the drunkometer, the proper meth-
ods of taking the test and his interpretaton of the operator's reading
of "0.21". In upholding the defendant's conviction the court held
that the operator "testified only as to his observation of the physical
condition of the defendant and as to the number of the reading
which he obtained from the 'Drunkometer' test. He did not, as an
expert or layman, undertake to interpret or analyze what the read-
ing '0.21' meant, nor express any opinion in that respect."
In a similar case, State v. Gregoire,10 7 in which an "Alcometer
test" was administered by a police captain, the court held that the
officer's lack of training precluded his giving testimony. It was
shown at the trial that, in 1949, during a two week course in police
training he had received three hours of instruction in how to operate
the device. His testimony showed that he had also described the
steps used in administering the test. As in the Gagnon case, the
104. Alexander v. State, 305 "P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
105. Omohundro v. Arlington County, 194 Va. 773, 75 S.E.2d 496 (1953).
106. 151 Me. 501, 121 A.2d 345 (1956).
107. 148 A.2d 751 (B.I., 1959).
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operator's testimony was supported by an expert witness who testi-
fied as to the scientific reliability of the device, and that the "Alco-
meter" had been designed to permit it's operation by a person of
ordinary intelligence.
The court here strictly construed the qualifications necessary to
operate the Alcometer and in citing Wigmore stated:
"The general rule is that scientific tests, in order to be ad-
missible as evidence, must have been conducted by one who is
expert in the particular branch of science concerned."108
The court here recognized that the qucstion of whether a witness
is qualified to testify as an expert is within the sound judicial dis-
cretion of the trial court and subsequently held that the trial judge
abused that discretion in allowing the operator's testimony.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The demand for accurate, scientific methods of testing to deter-
mine definite evidence of intoxication must be balanced on the
judicial scale against the necessity of safeguarding the individual's
constitutional rights. The problem arises on the question of ad-
missibility of compulsory chemical test results, and is further comp-
licated in the case of blood tests due to the invasion of the body
which occurs when the skin is pierced or a body fluid is extracted.
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court,' Mr. Justice Clark con-
sidered the conflict of interests involved in his delivery of the
majority opinion:
"As against the right of an individual that his person be held
inviolable, even against so slight an intrusion as is involved in
applying a blood test . . . must be set the interests of society in
the scientific determination of intoxication, one of the great
causes of the mortal hazards of the road."2
The great majority of courts will admit evidence of chemical
tests where the person has voluntarily submitted to the testing.
However, further legal problems arise when the test procedure is
conducted without the consent of the accused. The apprehended
person usually contends that to extract a specimen of blood, urine,
or saliva, or to conduct a breath test without consent constitutes an
unlawful search and seizure, violates his privilege against self-in-
crimination, and violates his right of due process of law.
108. Id. at 752.
1. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
2. Id. at 439.
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A. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
"The right of the people to be secure .. . against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "3
These words, which are included in the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, " form the basis for the privilege
against arbitrary intrusion by officialdom of one's security and pri-
vacy.5 All states have constitutional or statutory provisions cover-
ing searches and seizures which in intent are substantially the same
as those found in the Fourth Amendment.6 These provisions do not
establish a prohibition against all searches and seizures but only
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the federal con-
stitution and those of the states, search under a valid warrant is
reasonable, and conversely search under an invalid warrant is
unreasonable.7 Even without a warrant there may be special cir-
cumstances which make a search and seizure reasonable.' The right
to search without a warrant, when incident to a lawful arrest, is
reasonable 9 when based upon the necessity of the situation. It is
granted to protect the arresting officer from violence, to prevent
the escape of the arrestee, and to prevent destruction of evidence of
the crime.'°  Whether the search of the person or his effects is
reasonable obviously must be determined by the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case."
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
4. The entire fourth amendment reads: 'The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."
5. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) where Mr. Justice Douglas
declared that the fourth amendment guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures "marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values of our civiliza-
t'on . . ." 335 U.S. at 453.
6. E.g., N.D. Const. art. 1, § 18. The North Dakota provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures follows the federal provision verbatim.
7. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). "It is a cardinal rule . . . in
seizing goods and articles (that) law enforcement agents must secure and use search war-
rants wherever *reasonably practicable." 334 U.S. at 705. (Murphy, J.).
8. "The critical points in each case where a search without a warrant . . . is to be
justified are (1) whether the information of the searching officer was sufficient to justify a
reasonable person in believing that he bad probable cause to search and (2) whether the
facts tending to show probable cause were actually known to the searching officer and relied
on by him in entering upon the.search." MACHFN, LAW OF SEAsCH AND SEazuaE 50
(1950).
9. People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957). "Where there are
reasonable grounds for an arrest, a reasonable search of a person . . . to obtain evidence
against him is justified as an incident .toi rrest, and the search is not unlawful merely be-
cause it precedes, rather than follows, the: arrest." 312 P.2d at 693; accord, People v.
Knox, 178 Cal.App.2d 502, 3 Cal.Rptr 70 (1960); People v. Caruso, 339 i1. 258, 171
N.E. 128 (1930).
10. See Agnello v. United :States, 269 -U.S. 20 (1925).
11. "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search rwas reasonable. That criterion in ,turn-depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances- the total atmosphere of the case." Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S.
56, 66 (1950).
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But even if it is determined that the evidence was obtained as a
result of an illegal search and seizure, the courts, depending upon
the state of the law which exists in a particular jurisdiction, may
still admit such evidence. The season for this curious anamaly is
found in a rule of evidence which considers the means of obtaining
such evidence a collateral matter that does not effect its admissi-
bility. Another, however, excludes such evidence and is called the
federal exclusionary rule. Therefore, whether the courts will admit
illegally obtained evidence necessarily depends upon the present
status of these two opposing views in the various jurisdictions.
Hence, before a discussion of search and seizure may be adequately
presented, a sufficient understanding of these rules is considered
essential.
(1) The Federal Exclusionary Rule. At common law, the admis-
sibility of evidence is not affected by the illegal means in which it is
obtained.12 Thus, under the common law rule of non-exclusion,
evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search is admis-
sible in a criminal trial,13 notwithstanding the constitutional prohi-
bitions against such searches. Until the Supreme Court of the
United States departed from the rule in one of its decisions in
1914,4 the non-exclusionary rule had been firmly established and
adhered to.
Then, in the celebrated case of Weeks v. United States," the
Supreme Court held that evidence illegally seized by federal offi-
cials in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in a
federal criminal prosecution." Following the Weeks case, the fed-
eral exclusionary rule was very strictly enforced and its influence
soon spread to many of the states which adopted similar rules.17
The federal courts have justified their stand for the most part on
the ground that the courts cannot in one breath enforce the consti-
tution and in the next participate in illegal practices by receiving
12. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2183, 2184a (3d ed. 1940).
13. State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046 (1896); State v. Bond,. 12 Idaho 424,
86 Pac. 43 (1906); Ciano v. State, 105 Ohio St. 229, 137 N.E. 11 (1922).
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
16. The Weeks rule is codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 4 1(c). See generally MACHEN,
THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE c. IV (1950).
17. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940). See appendix to Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), where the Court lists 26 states as adopting the ex-
clusionary rule: Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
From this it seems that the tide has turned in favor of the rule of exclusion. This is
the view taken by the Court in Elkins, supra, where it was stated that "the movement




the fruits of unconstitutional searches and seizures.' s On a more
practical basis, the courts have reasoned that it is the only realistic
method of avoiding persistent violations of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments by law enforcement officers. 19
But another question arose in Weeks, concerning the applicabi-
lity of the exclusionary rule in state courts, when the Court declared
that the Fourth Amendment did not bind state officers. 20 The
Court's answer came in 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado,21 holding that
although the sanction of an exclusionary rule was not required of
the states by the federal constitution, nevertheless "the security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment -is ... implicit in the 'concept
of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause. '"22 Despite the holding in the
Wolf case, however, the practice remained until recently of admit-
ting illegally seized evidence in a federal trial, obtained by a state
officer, without any federal participation, by having it handed over
on a "silver platter""' to federal authorities."' Since Wolf the status
of the 'silver platter' doctrine remained uncertain,2-' although one
of the lower federal courts held that the Weeks and Wolf decisions,
considered together, make all unlawfully seized evidence exclud-
able, regardless of federal participation . 2  Then, in the recent deci-
18. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). "The duty of giving to it (fourth
amendment) force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system
with the enforcement of the laws." 232 U.S. at 392. In Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion declares that the "govenment
should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the
evidence is to be obtained . . . . I think it a less evil some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part." 277 U.S. at 470.
19. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); accord, Caroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (192.5); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945) (The ex-
clusionaryrule is the "only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege . . . .")
153 F.2d at 499 (Hand, J.); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir.
1940) passim.
20. Some of the articles used as evidence against Weeks had been unlawfully seized by
local police officers acting on their own behalf. The Court held that the admission of this
evidence was not error for the reason that "the Fourth Amendment is not directed to in-
dividual misconduct of such officials: Its limitations reach the Federal government and its
agencies." 232 U.S. at 398.
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
22. Id. at 27-28.
23. The 'silver platter' label was first coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
79 (1949).
24. Lustig v. United States, supra note 23; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921);
Graham v. United States, 257 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1958); Grimes v. United States, 234
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1956).
But, where a state officer conducts a search on behalf of or in co-operation with fed-
eral officers, the evidence is inadmissible in a federal court. Gambino v. United States,
275 U.S. 310 (1927) (aiding in federal law enforcement); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1927) (participation of federal officers in illegal search by state officers); Sutherland v.
United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937) (pursuant to a plan of co-operation between
federal and state agencies).
25. Benanti v. United States. 355 U.S. 96, 102 n. 10 (1957).
26. Hanna v. United States,. 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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Sion of Elkins v. United States,'2 7 the doctrine was specifically de-
nied where the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart speaking for a majority
of five,'20 held that "evidence obtained by state officers during a
search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated
the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's
timely objection in a federal criminal trial." 2 9
Under the new exclusionary rule the test of inadmissibility now
seems to be that any act of a state official which, if committed by a
federal official, would violate a person's right under the Fourth
Amendment is also in violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Apart from the relationship of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the tests under each, the real
problem involved is the extent to which the Court's supervisory
power over the lower federal courts ° should be used in criminal
prosecutions. It could be used not only to enforce the conduct of
federal officials3 ' but also to deter unconstitutional conduct of state
officials as well, thereby keeping the federal courts from participat-
ing in such lawlessness.3 2 The desire to keep the courts free of law-
lessness would therefore seem to support a rule excluding evidence
obtained in violations of state law as well as federal law.
It is submitted that in states which admit all evidence without
regard to how it was obtained as does North Dakota 3 3 the deter-
rent effect of the Elkins rule will have some influence upon a state
official's conduct. Under the "silver platter" doctrine, whenever state
officials seized evidence with a view to federal prosecution, it was
excluded in the federal courts. : '3 In other instances, when a state
official was seeking evidence for use in a state prosecution, its pos-
sible inadmissibility in a federal court would not affect him. Never-
theless, the realization that evidence may turn out to be relevant to
a federal prosecution, but be inadmissible there if illegally obtained,
should certainly have some influence on a state official's conduct;
and, as the Court stated in Elkins, the old rule "implicitly invites
27. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
28. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the dissent in which Justices Clark, Harlan, and
Whittaker joined.
29. Elkins v. United States, supra note 27, at 223; accord, Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253 (1960).
30. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
31. See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (5-4 decision) (The Court en-
joined a federal officer, who had seized evidence illegally, from producing such evidence
in a state court - the 'silver platter' in reverse.)
32. See McNabb v. United States, 318, U.S. 332 (1943); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 469, 471 (1928) (dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.)
33. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925); accord, State v. Lacy, 55 N.D.
83, 212 N.W. 442 (1927).
34. See Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
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federal officers to withdraw from . . . association (and cooperation
with state officers) and at least tacitly to encourage state officers in
the disregard of constitutionally protected freedom.""5 One prac-
tical difficulty that will surely arise is that state officers may uncover
evidence in an unconstitutional search that is relevant to a federal
violation, thereby thwarting the federal agency's opportunity to use
the evidence in conducting an effective prosecution. It is for this
very reason alone, it seems, that it will be necessary for the federal
government to prevail upon state officials not to make unconstitu-
tional searches and seizures. Thus, the new rule may have an in-
direct if not a direct influence on state officials.
In view of the foregoing discussion of the rationale of the rule
and the reasons for its adoption on the federal level and in twenty-
six other jurisdictions, it is difficult to square North Dakota's present
stand on the side of the non-exclusionary states. ' The North Da-
kota Constitution provides for the person to be "secure from un-
reasonable searches and seizures." 7 Furthermore, the basis for the
rule is to protect individual interests from invasions of privacy with-
out lawful warrants and to discourage overzealous police activity
by rejecting the evidence thus obtained, regardless of its reli-
ability.8 Any other concept must support the proposition that our
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures is being flouted and that our courts are being used to dignify
evidence obtained by such searches.:' Therefore, it is urged that,
in North Dakota at least, this proposition be avoided by simply
adopting a similar form of the federal exclusionary rule.
(2). The Internal Search Problem at the Federal Level. When
the courts are confronted with the problem of whether submission
of the body to a compulsory chemical-test is a search and seizure,
they generally concede that it is, and have passed on to the more
difficult problems of whether the search was unreasonable and
whether it was made under the aegis of a lawful arrest.40 Though
35. 364 U.S. at 221-22.
36. See note 17 su pra.
37. N.D. Const. art. 1, § 18.
38. "We have been compelled to reach that conclusion, viz., evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure is inadmissible, because other remedies have completely failed to
secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the
attendant result that the courts under he old rule have been constantly required to partici-
pate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers." People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955).
39. In adopting the exclusionary rule, the California court recognized the need to pro-
tect both the "rights guaranteed by the constitutional provisions and the interests of so-
ciety in the suppression of crime." People v. Cahan, supra note 38, at 915.
40. Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1957). appeal denied 249
F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1957);
United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949); In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp.
294 (N.D. Tex. 1949); cf. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957).
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the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet ruled on the
reasonableness of an internal search of the body or its substances, "
a Ninth Circuit decision, in Blackford v. United States,42 suggested
a solution to the general problem of internal bodily search. In
crossing from Mexico into the United States at the California bor-
der, Blackford was stopped by the customs officials4 3 and was asked
to remove his coat. Numerous puncture marks were revealed in his
arms and further examination of his person found that he may have
concealed a quantity of narcotics in a body cavity. Thereafter he
was taken to a hospital where, despite his denial of concealment and
his resistance to search, a qualified doctor withdrew a rubber finger-
stall containing heroin. Blackford's resistance was so great that it
was necessary to apply force in order to hold him in the appropri-
ate position. Moreover, because of the struggle, the doctor was un-
able to reach the package manually, but was required to utilize an
anoscope and forceps in order to remove the object. In a subse-
quent prosecution for illegal importation and concealment of heroin,
the court held that the search and seizure did not violate either the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments. The court applied the test of reason-
ableness to the conduct of the officers and their search, noting that
the use of a medically approved procedure administered by a quali-
fied physician, with force applied only after the defendant demon-
strated his refusal to cooperate for his own "safety and protection",
was reasonable conduct.
In arriving at the standards to be met for permitting this internal
search of the body, the court pointed out that it was well establish-
ed that a search incident to a valid arrest is not invalid, so long as
the arresting officer has "probable cause for believing that the sus-
pect has or is committing a felony."' The court further noted that
although the arrest may be valid, the scope and method of search
which follows is circumscribed by the standards of reasonableness
implicit in the due process clause." This view recognizes the pro-
position that although there are accepted values regarding the dig-
nity of the human body, it should not be held inviolate, but that
some reasonable limit should be placed upon internal bodily
searches.41 Conversely, to advocate a total prohibition of internal
41. See 50 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 144, 145 n. 15 (1959).
42. 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958); see Note,
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165 (1958).
43. The search of persons, vehicles, and vessels by customs inspectors is authorized by
Rev. Stat. § 3061 (1875), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1958); 49 Stat. 521 (1935), 19 U.S.C. §
1581 (1958); 46 Stat. 748 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1958).
44. 247 F.2d at 749.
45. The due process standards are discussed at text accompanying notes 112-20 infra.
46. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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bodily searches would be to place valuable evidence out of reach
of the law and would see the law enforcement procedures grind to
halt. Thus, the Blackford decision does not subject a human being
to any type of physical examination, but does indicate that pain and
danger are to be considered minimal, especially when caused by the
defendant's own conduct.
The court compared and contrasted Rochin v. California 1 and
Breithaupt v. Abram,"s due process cases, as guides for determining
the test of reasonableness. In the Rochin case, officers broke into
the defendant's room and saw him swallow what appeared to have
been two capsules believed by them to contain narcotics. They
struggled to open his mouth to remove the capsules but were un-
able to do so. He was then taken to a hospital where his stomach
was pumped by the use of an emetic and the capsules were recover-
ed. The defendant's conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court
as being violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court said:
"This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally break-
ing into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth . .. the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents -
this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain
evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They
are methods too close to the rack and the screw ... "49
The Breithaupt case, on the other hand, upheld the use of ap-
proved medical techniques as a protective measure, and as a means
of obtaining evidence. There the defendant was subjected to a
blood test, while he was unconscious, for the purpose of deter-
mining the percentage of alcohol in his blood. Thereafter he was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and the results of the blood
test were used as evidence of his intoxication. As against the con-
tention that the extraction of blood was so brutal and offensive that
it 'shocked the conscience,' and thereby falling within the Rochin
doctrine, the Court declared, through Mr. Justice Clark:"0
"Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is noth-
'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when
done . . . under the protective eye of a physician."'"
In arriving at its decision the Court considered the social prob-
lem to be solved, and reasoned that:
47. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
48. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
49. 342 U.S. at 172; cf. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957)
(police officer twisted defendant's arms behind his back while another officer forcefully ob-
tained a specimen).
50. Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
51. 352 U.S. at 435.
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[Slince our criminal law is ... justified by the assump-
tion of deterrence, the individual's right to immunity from such
invasion of the body as is involved in a properly safeguarded
blood test is far outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect
due to public realization that the issue of driving while under
the influence of alcohol can often by this method be taken out
of the confusion of conflicting contentions. ' -
From these two cases, the Blackford decision distinguished the
ruling of Rochin and said that the Breithaupt decision was indica-
tive of the true state of the law."3 To extract narcotics from a sus-
pected smuggler's rectum by means of recognized medical prac-
tices5 ' and to extract blood from a suspected drunken driver who is
unable to resist,55 therefore, does not violate the constitutional pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 Moreover, it
is interesting to, note the highly practical approach that the courts
take to the overall problem.5 It is submitted that the gravity of the
social problem presented by drunken driving warrants a 'medical'
invasion of the body in the 'scientific determination of intoxication.'
Indeed, as one court stated,' s it should not be forgotten that "a test
of this kind may serve to exonerate, as well as to convict."59
(3) The Internal Search Problem at the State Level. Although
precedents relating to searches and seizures of body substances at
the federal level are few in number, the chemical-test cases of the
states are impressive, both in number and in inconsistency. This
lack of unity among the states is due largely to a failure on the part
of law enforcement agencies to promulgate standard operating pro-
cedures for arresting, searching, and seizing evidence of the viola-
tors."6 Moreover, the fact that the federal exclusionary rule is fol-
lowed in only one-half of the states also contributes to the dis-
unity.' Nevertheless, in determining whether a search and seizure
52. Id. at 439-40.
53. 247 F.2d at 752; accord, King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1958)
(rectal probe: noting the "sterility which would follow efforts at law enforcement," if they
were not allowed such searches); Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal.
1957) (rectal probe), appeal denied, 249 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Michel 158, F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1957).
It seems, however, that there is a remarkable difference between a forced bowel move-
ment and a forced regurgitation. This, because two other district courts have ruled that
the use of a stomach pump and an emetic to recover narcotics is unreasonable. United
States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949); In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294
(N.D. Tex. 1949).
54. Blackford v. United States, supra note 53.
55. Breithaup v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
56. Cf. United States v. Willis 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (stomach pump);
In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex. 1949) (stomach pump).
57. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); King v. United States, 258 F.2d
754 (5th Cir. 1958).
58. People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
59. Id. at 694.
60. See e.g., MACHEN, THE LAw OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, C. IV passim (1950).
61. See text accompanying notes 30-39 supra.
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of a human being would be unlawful, the state decisions do stress
certain fundamental factors of conduct. A consideration of these
factors will be discussed in the following pertinent chemical-test
cases.
In 1953, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that obtaining a
specimen of breath for chemical-testing purposes did not constitute
a violation of the search and seizure provision of the state consti-
tution.62 The defendant, after his arrest for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, had protested against and objected
to being given a breath test. Despite this, the police officers strap-
ped him to a chair in the police station, and while one officer held
his head steady, the other, as the defendant, of necessity exhaled,
captured his breath by means of a rubber suction bulb and tube
held up in front of his mouth and nose, and passed it through a
drunkometer for analysis. Holding that this conduct on the part
of the officers did not constitute an unlawful search and seizure, the
court pointed out that the defendant ". . . was not forced to exhale
breath from his lungs, (since) he exhaled it voluntarily. . . . The
moment his breath passed his lips it was no longer his to control
but became a part of the surrounding atmosphere which was
equally free for use by anyone present.. .. . Thus, the officers
had the lawful right to capture the breath after it left the defend-
ant's body for use as evidence. Although the reasoning of the
Arizona court is quite unique, it is submitted that this decision is a
very tenuous one, and at most, a remarkable attempt on the part of
the court to make the end justify the means.
Another court, which followed the non-exclusionary rule, consid-
ered the obtaining of chemical test evidence from the standpoint of
due process with relation to an alleged illegal search and seizure."
The defendant, a woman driver, had been involved in a collision
with another vehicle, an occupant of which had been killed as a
result. The defendant also had been seriously injured and it was
found at the hospital that a blood transfusion was necessary in
order to save her life. An attending physician extracted a specimen
of blood, from her to determine what type of blood was needed for
the transfusion, and a small amount left over from this was analyz-
ed for blood alcohol concentration. Evidence of the result of this
62. State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
63. Id. at 265.
64. People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953). Attention is directed to
the subsequent departure of California from the non-exclusionary rule at notes 38-39 supra.
It is necessary for the non-exclusionary rule states to consider illegally obtained evidence
under the due process standards. Thus the test becomes one of reasonableness of conduct.
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test was used in obtaining her conviction for manslaughter in driv-
ing while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, the
defendant contended that any taking of evidence, by force, from the
person without consent violates due process of law, and that the
force used here consisted of puncturing the skin with a needle to
withdraw blood. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court
of California declared that:
"The taking of a blood test, when accomplished in a medical-
ly approved manner, does not smack of brutality. In recent
years, millions of young men have been subjected to such tests
as an incident to induction into military service .... Here, the
only unauthorized action . . . was to remove one additional
cubic centimeter of blood after the hypodermic needle already
had been inserted. Certainly, this conduct cannot be charac-
terized as shocking to the conscience ... "65
Other courts, however, are inclined to bold the human body in-
violate and will not sanction a medical invasion. Although Iowa
does not follow the federal exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court of
Iowa has held evidence of a blood test inadmissible when obtained
from an unconscious defendant by a 'volunteer,' no arrest having
been made or crime charged.16 The defendant, while driving in an
intoxicated condition, collided with another vehicle killing three
occupants of the other car. The defendant was rendered uncon-
scious as a result of the collision and was transported to a hospital
for treatment. While he was still unconscious, a coroner from an-
other county, who was a doctor, proceeded to draw blood from his
arm, without requesting the consent of the defendant's wife who
was waiting in a corridor. After having been informed of the result
some days later, the coroner caused the defendant to be arrested
and charged with homicide. In reversing his conviction on appeal,
the court said:
"... We have here then a situation where a volunteer, with-
out legal warrant and without express or implied assent, in-
trudes himself into an operating room and takes from an un-
conscious patient a blood sample to be used to make or sustain
possible future criminal prosecution. We cannot bring our-
selves to approve such a course .... 67
Instead of relying on unreasonable search and seizure or some
other valid legal foundation, the court's reversal seems to stem from
an abhorrence of an alien coroner. 8
65. Id. at 12-13; accord, State v. Pierce, 141 A.2d 419 (1958); People v. Duroncelay,
48 Cal.2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
66. State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519,.292 N.W. 148 (1940).
67. Id. at 149.
68. Prior decisions in Iowa show little unity of sentiment on this point. In State v.
Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902), it was held that a physical examination to
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The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Lebel v.
Swincicki," deserves attention at this point. The defendant was
transported to a hospital after a motor vehicle collision in which
several persons were fatally injured. There, while unconscious and
not under arrest, a sample of his blood was taken by a nurse who
testified that she did so at the direction of a physician. The chemi-
cal-test evidence was admitted at the trial court over the defend-
ant's objection, but the Supreme Court of Michigan held the evi-
dence inadmissible as a violation of the provision of the Michigan
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. The
court declared:
".... That the blood sample was taken... in violation of
defendant's right of security of his person is apparent. He was
unconscious at the time but that fact did not permit others to
invade his personal rights. We see no difference . . . between
obtaining a blood sample under the circumstances here in-
volved and taking it from a conscious person by force.' 0
Although the court excluded the chemical-test evidence, it ruled
that the conclusiveness of other evidence, i. e., defendant's admis-
sion of having had 'probably four bottles of beer,' the smell of al-
cohol, etc., did not warrant a reversal.
Illustrative of the principle that a search and seizure is reason-
able when the accused expressly and willingly consents, is a Wis-
consin decision involving a urine test.' The defendant caused a
collision as a result of which an occupant of his car was killed. At
the hospital, the defendant willingly consented to give a specimen
of his urine for chemical analysis of its alcoholic content at the re-
quest of a doctor sent there by the police. At his trial, the defend-
ant objected to the introduction of any chemical-test evidence on
the ground that it constituted illegal search and seizure. On ap-
peal, the overruling of this objection was upheld, the court stating:
"Defendant also contends that the procurement . . . of the
evidence . . . constituted an unreasonable search and seizure.
We see no merit in this contention. The record shows that the
defendant knew the purpose for which the sample was intend-
ed to be used, and voluntarily submitted to the tests.."'7
The time element is another vital factor that must be considered
determine traces of a venereal disease was an. unlawful search and seizure. In State v.
Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923), the court held that evidence obtained as a
result of unlawful search and seizure was admissible, despite federal decisions to the con-
trary.
69. 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
70. Id. at 286.
71. State v. Resler, 262 Wis. 285, 55 N.W.2d 35 (1952).
72. Id. at 38. The court found it necessary, however, to reverse the conviction because
the specimen was not taken for analysis within two hours of arrest as required by statute.
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by the courts when the tests are made without a search warrant
and without the accused's consent, or when made before the actual
arrest. A recent Wisconsin case, State v. Kroening,7 3 while seeking
to determine whether the taking of a blood specimen was incident
to the arrest, recognized that the withdrawal of the blood might be
reasonable if the suspect were under lawful arrest, but concluded
that a nine day interval between the seizure and the subsequent
arrest was not a search made incident to the arrest.7 4 One of the
contentions of the state was that the taking of the blood was not a
search and seizure but merely a physical examination; however, the
court disagreed, holding that a search and seizure and a physical
examination are not necessarily mutually exclusive.75 In discussing
the time element with the 'probable cause' and the 'incident to ar-
rest' requirements, the court said:
"The statement of facts . . . hardly warrants the assumption
that there was probable cause to arrest Kroening without war-
rant, but we . . . observe that he was not arrested until nine
days after the accident .... (I) t would seem most likely that it
was the result of the blood analysis rather than anything else
which supplied the probable cause ... ",6
In contrast with this view, however, is that of the California
court in the recent decision of People v. Duroncelay,77 to the effect
that even'though the taking of a blood specimen precedes the ar-
rest, if reasonable grounds existed for an arrest when the specimen
was obtaixied, then the seizure was lawful as an incident to the
arrest. Evidence showed that the defendant had not consented -.o
the taking of the specimen, indeed, it showed that he had drawn
his arm away when a registered nurse attempted to insert the
needle and that an ambulance driver then held his arm while the
nurse extracted the blood. The specimen was taken at the request
of the investigating officer who had detected an odor of alcohol in
the car and had noticed beer cans on the floor. In affirming the
trial court's ruling admitting the chemical-test results, the court
declared:
"It is obvious from the evidence that, before the blood
73. 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956). See Note, 41 Marq. L. Bev. 93 (1957).
74. The defendant was involved in a traffic collision as a result of which four persons
were killed. Shortly after, the defendant was taken to a hospital where a blood sample
was withdrawn without his consent on the basis of the detection of alcohol on his breath,
and the fact that the accident occurred in the opposite lane of travel. Nine days after the
accident and the chemical test, the defendant was placed under formal arrest. The test
results were held inadmissible and in reaching the decision the court expressed doubt as to
whether probable cause for arrest existed.
75. "We do not understand that the constitutional provision in question forbids officers
to go through one's pockets but permits them to go through his veins." 79 N.W.2d at 815.
76. Id. at 815.
77. 48 Cal.2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
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sample was taken at the request of the highway patrolman,
there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant had com-
mitted the felony of which he was convicted, and he could have
been lawfully arrested at that time. Where there are reasonable
grounds for an arrest, a reasonable search of a person and the
area under his control to obtain evidence against him is justified
as an incident to arrest, and the search is not unlawful merely
because it precedes, rather than follows, the arrest."' ' s
Thus, a search may constitutionally be made either before or after
arrest if reasonable grounds for making an arrest exists at the time
of the search. This rule not only assures the evidentiary value of
the chemical test from the standpoint of accuracy, but also allows
law enforcement officers to more easily comply with statutory re-
quirements respecting the time in which the test must be taken79
In summarizing the above decisions, it can generally be said that
the courts consider two basic factors as being vital in determining
whether a search and seizure is unreasonable: (1) conduct; and
(2) time. Where little force is used and the specimen is obtained
in a medically approved manner at or near the time of arrest, it
seems that law enforcement officers would have very little difficulty
in "discovering wrongdoers and bringing them to book."80 On the
other hand, where excessive or indiscriminate force is employed in
obtaining the specimen and without regard to the time of the actual
arrest, it appears that the law enforcement procedures would more
likely grind to a halt.
B. SELF-INCRIMINATION
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... "I
The above words, which are contained in the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution,12 form the basis for the privilege
against self-incrimination. And, although it is well settled that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is binding only upon the Federal gov-
ernment, 3 similar provisions exist in all of the states. It has also
78. Id. at 693; accord, People v. Knox, 178 Cal. App. 2d 502, 3 Cal.Rptr. 70 (1960)
(awaiting the return of the analysis before making the arrest was proper).
79. See N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192(1); Va. Code Ann. § 18-75.1 (Supp. 1958),
which impose two hours time limits within which the test must be made, measured from
the time of the arrest. But see Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507 (Supp. 1956); Wis. Stat.
§ 325.235 (1955), which impose a two hour time limit within which the test must be
made, measured from the time of the event.
It is interesting to note that North Dakota has no statutory provislon for a time limit
within which a chemical test must he made. See statutory comparison cited in Apped'x I.
80. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
81. U.S. Const. amend. V.
82. North Dakota also recognizes the privilege in statutory form. N.D. Cent. Code §
31-01-09 (1960).
All of the states have recognized the privilege, and the provisions of the state consti-
tutions are found in 8 WiGMoaE, EVmDENcE § 2252 n. 3 (3d ed. 1940).
83. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
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been ruled by the Supreme Court that the privilege against self-
incrimination, as embodied in the Fifth Amendment is not made
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8 4
However, proponents of this latter concept have gained momentum
as is evidenced in a later decision of the Supreme Court, where the
minority, favoring recognition of the privilege as being inherent in
due process, has jumped from one to four justices.8 5 A decision
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state recognition of a
privilege against self-incrimination would permit the Supreme
Court to control state activities dealing with the privilege. The con-
comitant potentialities of such a federal power, of course, would
become ominous.
Whenever the results of chemical tests to determine intoxication
are offered in evidence, it is a common contention that the privilege
against self-incrimination provided by the various state constitutions
has been violated. Since the constitutional and statutory provisions
of the several states vary in form and terminology, it is understand-
able that the states themselves have determined the circumstances
under which the privilege can be claimed. The contention most
frequently made is that submission to a blood, breath, urine, or
saliva test forces an accused to supply evidence to be used in his
own prosecution, but the great majority of courts have refused to
accept this argument and have concluded that historically the scope
of the privilege has been limited to testimonial compulsion.86 Stated
more succinctly by Dean Wigmore, the privilege provides a safe-
guard against "the employment of legal process to extract from the
person's own lips an admission of his guilt.87 Thus, the majority
view of the privilege relates to the prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extract communications from the accused,
and does not apply to the admissibility in evidence of his body sub-
stances."8 In a recent Oklahoma decision, Alexander v. State,89 the
84. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
85. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See also Kauper, Supreme Court:
Trends in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155, 167-68 (1960).
86. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766,
312 P.2d 690 (1957); People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105, 194 P.2d 681 (1948); Block v.
People, 235 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951), cert. deni-d, 343 U.S. 978 (1952); Alldredge
v. State, 156 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. 1959); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909
(1950); State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); Alexander v. State,
305 P.2d 572 (Okla.Crim. 1956); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945);
Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa.Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936); State v. Smith, 230 S.C.
164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956); State v. Pierce, 120 Vt. 383, 141 A.2d 419 (1958).
87. 8 WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940).
88. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), where the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Holmes, lays out the line of demarcation more clearly: "But the prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the
use of. physical or moral compulsion to exort communication from him, not an exclusion of
his body as evidence when it may be material." 218 U.S. at 252-53.
89. 305 P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
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court discussed the reason for the rule that distinguishes between
'oral' and 'physical' evidence, and said:
"From the textbooks and cases the distinction between evi-
dence elicited from the lips of an accused or by writings made
is this. That where such evidence is given either in fear of
punishment or in hope of escaping punishment, it is not re-
ceived as evidence because experience shows that the accused
is liable to be influenced by these motives, and such evidence
cannot be relied on as guides to truth. But . . . this objection
will not apply to evidence of the nature complained of (blood
test) . . . because no hopes or fears of the accused could
change one iota the physical facts."90
Thus, the purpose of the privilege, as adopted by the great
weight of authority, is to protect against the extraction of evidence
from the accused's lips and to safeguard his right to remain silent
at his trial. Any other compelled conduct or its products, however
unlawful or inadmissible on other grounds, is not within the protec-
tion of this privilege.91
Only a small minority of courts tend to extend the privilege to
physical evidence secured outside the courtroom if obtained under
compulsion. s2 Under this view of the privilege it seems that the
results of the chemical tests would still be admitted, for the rule
excluding coerced confessions is predicated upon the unreliability
of the evidence so obtained. As was pointed out so clearly in the
Alexander case, supra, physical evidence is not altered 'one iota' by
the amount of compulsion used."3
(1) The 'Consent' Question. Some courts, instead of adhering
to the rule that the self-incrimination privilege is applicable only to
testimonial compulsion, evade it by finding lack of compulsion, or
waiver of the privilege through express or implied consent.94  Of
90. Id. at 577-78.
91. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 23(3), 25(b) 25(c).
92. Trammell v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 543, 287 S.W.2d 487 (1956); Apodaca v.
State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1911); cf. Bethel v. State, 178 Ark. 277, 10
S.W.2d 370 (1938); People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N.W. 309 (1928); State v.
Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909).
93. The court further added that a "fetish" should not be made of the self-incrimination
privilege "to protect enemies of society, and the drunken driver seems to be percisely that."
305 P.2d at 585.
94. Spittler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E.2d 591 (1943) (volunteered to test in order
to exonerate); State v. Sampson, 248 Iowa 458, 79 N.W.2d 210 (1959) (expressly con-
sented); State v. Small, 233 Iowa 1280, 11 N.W.2d 377 (1943) (absence of 'duress');
State v. Daugherty, 320 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1959) (written permission signed nine hours
after obtaining specimen).
Some courts in jurisdictions that have established the general rule as precedence, i. e.,
limitation to testimonial compulsion, decide instead upon waiver of the privilege by reason
of consent of the accused. State v. Haley, 132 Mont. 366, 318 P.2d 1084 (1957); Bowden
v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 382, 246 P.2d 427 (1952).
The courts in those states that have adopted the so-called 'implied consent' statutes
may decide on the basis of waiver, since the accused has already impliedly consented in
advance hereby waiving his privilege against self-incrimination. See text accompanying
notes 141-44 infra.
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course, in those jurisdictions where express or implied consent is a
condition precedent to the admissibility of test results, very little
difficulty should arise regarding the self-incrimination privilege.95
Other courts have held that submission to a chemical test was vol-
untary and the privilege waived because, in the absence of any
compulsion, there was no protest or objection by the accused to the
taking of the specimen.9" Even in those jurisdictions where express
consent is required, it is generally held that written consent is not
necessary;9 7 nor is it necessary to warn the accused, before submit-
ting to the chemical test, that the results may be used against him.s
In considering the foregoing aspects of consent, however, the courts
avoid, for the moment, the necessity of taking a stand on whether
the privilege is limited only to testimonial compulsion, or whether it
should be extended to the obtaining of physical evidence as held by
the minority.
A very interesting question arises regarding the privilege against
self-incrimination when specimens are obtained for determining in-
toxication from a person who. is unable to give his consent. In
many accident cases, the person is actually unconscious or very
badly injured at the time the sample is taken and is therefore in no
position to voice his approval, or disapproval. Despite this obvious
invasion of privacy, most authorities have held that evidence so ob-
tained is admissible.9  Also, it is no defense to a charge of driving
95. In two states the case law requires express consent. State v. Wardlaw, 107 So.2d
179 (Fla. 1958); McCreary v. State, 307 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. 1957). For chemical
test legislation see Colo. Rev. Stat. Anni. § 13-4-30(1) (Supp. 1937); N.J. Rev. Stat. §
39:4-50 (Supp. 1959); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 483.992(2) (1959); and Va. Code Ann. §
18-75 (Supp. 1959), which requires the accused's express consent. (Oregon .requires
written consent). This means that chemical test results obtained from unconscious persons,
from critically injured persons, or from the highly intoxicated person, who would be in-
capable of giving consent, would be held inadmissible.
Attention is directed to the implied consent laws enactd in the following states which
reason that an individual has impliedly consented in advance to submit to a chemical test as
a condition of the state's granting use of its highways: Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, New
York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. See applicable statutes cited
note 121 infra.
96. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435 (1937); Touchton v. State, 154 Fla.
547, 18 So.2d 752 (1944); State v. Ko-nig, 240 Iowa 592, 36 N.W.2d 765 (1949);
People v. Coppock, 206 Misc. 89, 133 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1954); Logan v. State, 269 P.2d
380 (Okla. Crim. 1954).
97. Texas leads in cases on this point because it has a confssion statute which re-
quires that a confession be obtained froin an accused in writing, after his arrest. But the
Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to extend this requirement to the obtaining of chem-
ical test specimens. Tealer v. State, 163 Tex. Crin. 629, 296 S.W.2d 260 (1956).
98. State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz, 176, 72 P.2d 435 (1937); People v. Hardin, 138
Cal. App. 2d 169, 291 P.2d 193 (1955); State v. Libby, 153 Me. 1, 133 A.2d 877 (1957);
State v. Titak, 144 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio App. 1955).
It is probably the btter practice, however, for the arresting officer to notify the accused
of his rights. See People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73, 120 N.E.2d 211 (1954) (requesting to
submit to chemical test under provisions of implied consent statute).
99. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); People-.v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252,
260 P.2d 8 (1953); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1952); State v.
Pierce, 120 Vt. 373, 141 A.2d 419 (1958).
North Dakota takes the opposite view, however, by expressly providing in statutory form
NOTES
while intoxicated for an accused to contend that if he was under the
influence of intoxicants then he was also mentally incapable of
waiving his constitutional rights and therefore the alleged consent
was invalid.1°0 The general rule is that if the accused is capable of
comprehending events and his surroundings, then he is capable of
legally consenting to submit to the proffered tests.1"1 Again, how-
ever, in those jurisdictions requiring express censent as a condition
precedent to the admissibility of test results12 it is conceivable that
cxtreme intoxication as a defense may be a valid argument which
would render the chemical-test evidence inadmissible. 10 3
(2) Admissibility of Testimony of Refusal to Submit to Chemi-
cal Testing. In many instances the accused actually refuses to sub-
mit to a chemical test, which necessarily begs the question whether
the fact of his refusal may be admitted into evidence or be com-
mented upon at the trial. Although the decisions on this point are
not in full agreement, many of the courts reason that if the privilege
against self-incrimination is not applicable to the obtaining of chemi-
cal-test evidence, then such an objection to the admissibility of re-
fusal to submit to the test is without merit.' ° But even if the privi-
lege were applicable to chemical-test evidence, the majority of the
courts allowing comment on the refusal adopt the rationale that to
admit such evidence indicates the accused's conduct, demeanor, and
attitude toward the crime, all of which suggests a consciousness of
guilt.'1 5 On the other hand, some courts have held that evidence
that when a person is unconscious, or otherwise incapable of refusal, his implied consent to
submit is withdawn. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-03 (1960). See text accompanying notes
126-29 infa.
100. State v. Sampson, 248 Iowa 458, 79 N.W.2d 210 (1956) (while unde medication
with narcotic and had 0.186% blood alcohol concentration); Bowden v. State, 95 Okla.
Crim. 382, 246 P.2d 427 (1952) (express consent given for test that showed 0.150%);
Jones v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 29, 261 S.W.2d 161 (1953) (gave written consent to test
which showed 0.275%), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 830 (1953). Contra, State v. Anderson,
247 Minn. 469, 78 N.W.2d 320 (1956), where the court held that the injured defendant,
while under medication and with 0.310% blood alcohol concentration, was in too much of
a stupor to make a valid confession that he was the driver of the death car.
101. People v. Quarles, 123 Cal. App. 2d 1, 266 P.2d 68 (1954); Ray v. State, 233 Ind.
495, 120 N.E.2d 176 (1954); Commonwealth v. Mummert, 183 Pa. Super. 638, 133 A.2d
301 (1957).
102. See note 95 upra.
103. See State v. Anderson, 247 Minn. 469, 78 N.W.2d 320 (1956). In Minnesota, ad-
missibility of test results is dependent upon a voluntary submission. Minn. Stat. § 169.121
(1957).
104. See State v. Gratton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); State v. Smith,
230 S.C. 164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956); City of Barron v. Covey, 271 Wis. 10, 72 N.W.2d
387 (1955).
105. "It is proper to show the defendant's conduct, demeanor, and statements (not merely
self-serving), whether oral or written, his attitude and relations toward the crime, if there
was one. These are circumstances that may be shown. Their weight is for the jury to
determine. The fact that defendant declined to submit to a blood test is such a circum-
stance. It may be shown. The jury may consider it. The evidence was admissible." State
v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275, 277 (1941); accord, State v. Smith, 230 S.C.
164, 94 S.E.2d 886 (1956).
19611
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of the accused's refusal to submit is inadmissible °6 on the basis of
statutes or ordinances granting the accused the right to refusal. 1 7
Other courts admit evidence of such refusals when the defendant
himself or his counsel opens the door or fails to object.'0 8 North
Dakota has expressly adopted this latter view into its so-called 'im-
plied consent' law where it provides that "proof of refusal shall be
admissible ... provided the person shall first have testified .... "109
Recently however, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that, although
its implied consent statute grants the right to refuse to submit to
chemical tests, the evidence of such refusal, nevertheless, is com-
petent and admissible." '° Such evidence was like any other act or
statement voluntarily made by the defendant and was competent
for the jury to consider and weigh, and to draw from it whatever in-
ference as to guilt or innocence that might be justified under the
circumstances. The court compared the North Dakota and Idaho
statutes pointing out that in Idaho, "by operating a motor vehicle
... the defendant is 'deemed to have given his consent to a chemical
te s t."' ,,
In summary, it would seem that comment upon refusal to submit
to a chemical test would not work any real undue hardship on the
accused at his trial. Such evidence, when considered from the
standpoint that it is analogous to any other act or statement volun-
106. People v. Knutson, 17 Ill. App. 2d 251, 149 N.E.2d 461 (1958); State v. Severson,
75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956); People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362
(1955). Contra. State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958).
107. Some state statutes authorizing the use of test results specifically prohibit comment
upon the failure to submit to the test. E.g., Colo. Rev. Sat. §13-4-30 (Cum. Supp. 1955);
Ga. Code Ann. § 68-1625 (Rev. 1957); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. § 483.630 (1955); Va.
Code Ann. § 18-75.1-75.3 (Supp. 1958); Wash. Rev, Code § 46.56.010 (1951). Some
state decisions holding the evidence inadmissible on the basis of ordinances are: State v.
Simonson, 252 Mimn, 315, 89 N.W.2d 910 (1959); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103
(Okla. Crim 1957); Jordan v. State, 290 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Crim. 1056).
Under North Dakota's implied consent law, the accused's refusal is admissible provided
he has first testified in the action, N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-08 (1960). See text accom-
panying notes 130-37 infra.
103. Barnhart v. State, 302 P.2d 793 (Okla. Crim. 1956), where the court stated that
"when he (defendant) took the stand in his own behalf and opened up the matter of the
kind of tests to which he may h ve been subjected, he thereby waived the privilege and all
other relevant facts became pertinent and were admissible either on cross-examination or on
rebuttal .... " 302 P.2d at 796; accord, Hopkins v. State, 282 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Crim.
1955) (defendant forfeited right to object when he pursued the matter on cross-examina-
tion); Hartman v. State, 280 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. 1955) (failed to object). See also
State v. Tryon, 145 Conn. 304, 142 A.2d 54 (1958), in which refusal was held admis-
sible for purpose of showing state of intoxication because the defendant, upon being re-
quested to submit to breath test, said she would not blow up the balloon but would blow
the officer's head off.
109. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-08 (1960). This provision seems to be an adoption of
the decision in State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956), which held that where the
accused had not yet testified, and where his refusal under statute was absolute, such re-
fusal could not be commented upon.
110. State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958).
111. Id. at 1072. See Idaho Code Ann. § 49-353 (Supp. 1955).
Of course, this is precisely the language used in North Dakota's recently enacted im-
plied consent law. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01. Therefore, there should no longer be
any obstacle to admitting evidence of an accused's refusal in North Dakota courts.
tarily made, necessarily demands that it be admitted so that the jury
may consider and weigh all of the facts. To suggest that the state
should be denied the privilege of comment is yet another way of
making it difficult for effective law enforcement. Moreover, if the
privilege of refusal is granted to the arrested motorist in order to be
protected from overzealous police officers, it seems that he has
taken advantage of all the rights that are really necessary. There-
fore, it is submitted that allowing testimony of mere refusal to sub-
mit to a chemical test into evidence is not unduly prejudicial and
it does not affect the value of the privilege of refusal in any appre-
ciable degree.
C. DUE PROCESS
A third constitutional problem arises when an accused contends
that the chemical-test procedure violates his rights of due process
of law. It is not uncommon to find this defense coupled with that of
unreasonable search and seizure and the privilege against self-in-
crimination. 112 The most common due process objection, based on
the decision of Rochin v. California,"' arises when physical force
that offends a 'sense of justice,' or 'shocks the conscience,' is em-
ployed to extract the specimen necessary for an alcoholic analysis.
Thus, it is the reasonableness of the search and seizure that is the
issue of due process, the point being that in the non-exclusionary
rule states" 4 it is necessary to employ the Fourteenth Amendment,
or the state equivalent, to exclude such evidence."' The trend of
the decisions has been to limit the application of this doctrine to
'brutal' or 'offensive' cohiduct, 11 which is not found to exist when the
chemical tests are administered by qualified persons in an approved
manner." 7  In the recent decision of Breithaupt v. Abram,"' the
Supreme Court was called upon to distinguish the Rochin rule and
its applicability to compulsory chemical tests." 9 The Court empha-
sized the fact that brutality measured by the community sense of
justice was involved and not that of any praticular individual. Al-
though due process of law was not considered violated by the ex-
traction of a blood sample without consent, the Court pointed out
that if the test should be made indiscriminately or conducted by un-
112. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
113. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
114. See list of non-exclusionary states cited at note 17 supra.
115. State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953); People v. Kiss, 125 Cal. App. 2d
138, 269 P.2d 924 (1954).
116. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
117. "Basically . . . there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of
blood when done . . . under the protective eye of a physician." Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957).
118. Ibid.
119. For other aspects, see text accompanying notes 47-59 supra.
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qualified personnel, then there may be a basis for the application of
Rochin. In similar state criminal cases involving the admissibility
of chemical-test evidence, the due process argument has also been
generally unsuccessful.120 Thus, it is sufficient to state by way of
summary that a chemical test made by qualified persons, in the
approved manner, without offensive conduct to determine whether
the accused was driving while under the influence of alcohol is not
a violation of due process of law.
VI. A PRACTICAL SOLUTION AND COMPROMISE:
THE 'IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTES
A. SCOPE
Prompted by the growing menace of the intoxicated driver, as
well as the numerous constitutional and evidentiary questions in-
volved in obtaining chemical test evidence already mentioned, some
states have arrived at a commendable solution by enacting so-called
implied consent statutes.'12 1  The rationale upon which an implied
consent statute rests is that use of the highways is a privilege, 122
rather than a right, that is subject to reasonable conditions which
the state may impose in the interests of the public safety and wel-
fare. In enforcing these interests, the states have imposed the
familiar means of license, fine and imprisonment. Consequently, the
states conclude that it is reasonable to enact a statute which pro-
vides that every motorist who operates a motor vehicle upon the
highways impliedly consents in advance 1 3 to submit to a chemical
test of his blood, breath, urine, or saliva, should he be arrested for
driving while intoxicated. Paradoxically, the statutes also provide
that even though he has consented to the test, he may also refuse
to submit, but if he does refuse, the privilege of using the highways
120. State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953); People v. Duroncelay, 48 Co!o.2d
766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957); State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951); Alex-
ander v. State, 305 P.2d 572 (Okla. Grim. 1956).
121. Idaho Code Ann. § 49-352 (Supp. 1955); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-1001 (Supp.
1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39.727.03 (1960); N.Y. Vehicle & TFraffic Law § 1149 (1960);
N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01 (1960); S.D. Code § 44.0302-2 (Supp. 1960); Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1957); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1188 (1959). .
122. The great majority of the states, North Dakota included, regard the use of the
highways as a privilege. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-06-01 states that "'any person licensed as
an operator hereunder may exercise the privilege thereby granted .... ." (emphasis added).
123. The premise upon which the implied consent is based is not unique, for it is
analogous to the statutes dealing with jurisdiction over non-resident motorists. The non-
resident service statutes state that a non-resident motorist impliedly consents to service on
the state highway commissioner as his agent for any action arising from any accident incur-
red while he was in the state. These statutes have been upheld as constitutionally sound.
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The North Dakota Non-Resident Motor Vehicle
Act, N.D. Cent. Code § 39-01-11, employs this identical premise and was upheld in
Austinson v. Kilpatrick, 82 N.W.2d 388 (N.D. 1957).
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is forfeited, provided, however, that a subsequent hearing held by
the licensing agency determines that there was an unreasonable re-
fusal to submit to the test. This is essentially the nucleous of a
similar implied consent statute enacted by the North Dakota legis-
lature in 1959,-124 and contains almost identical provisions to those
provided in the Uniform Chemical Test For Intoxication Act.12 5
Despite the apparent similarity of our own implied consent statute
to the Uniform Act and to the other states, there are, however, some
conspicuous variations which deserve special consideration.
A unique, though unfortunate, feature of North Dakota's implied
consent law provides that "any person who is dead, unconscious or
who is otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal,
shall be deemed to have withdrawn the consent . . 2.125 Although
only one other implied consent state has expressly provided for a
section on those incapable of refusing to submit to a chemical test,
it has at least conformed to the Uniform Act by providing that such
persons are "deemed not to have withdrawn the consent .... 127
Indeed, one of the main reasons for implying consent in advance is
to avoid the thorny consent problem entirely with particular em-
phasis on the motorist who is rendered insensible from intoxicants
or is unconscious or dazed from an accident. Thus, the anomolous
provision in our present statute accomplishes only half the purpose
for which it was intended, since the accused must be in some nebu-
lous stage of alertness before the request to submit can be made.
Secondly, it seems obvious that the other state legislatures that have
enacted consent statutes intended that the chemical tests should be
obtained in all cases where refusals were not had. '-2s Therefore, it is
submitted that this inconsistent provision in our implied consent
law can only thwart the intended purpose of the statute, for auto-
matic consent serves its most useful function in such extreme situ-
124. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01 (1960).
125. The Uniform Laws Annotated lists North Dakota as being the only state which
has adopted the Act. The Uniform Act was approved by the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, and the American Bar Association in 1959, 9 U.L.A. (P.P. 1960
§ 3).
126. N.D. Cent. Code §, 39-20-03 (1960). Contra, UNIFORM CHEMICAL TEST FOR
INTOXICATION ACT § 3, which expressly provides that regardless of incapacity of the
accused, he shall be deemed not to have withdrawn his consent.
127. Neb. Rev. Sat. § 39-727.05 (1960).
128. State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958), reasoning that "by operating
a motor vehicle in this state the defendant is 'deemed to have given his consent to a
chemical test.' The only way he can withdraw that consent is to expressly refuse to test.
So under our law if he neither refuses nor consents, expressly, the test may be made." 328
P.2d at 1073; see State v. Pierce, 120 Vt. 373, 141 A.2d 419 (1958); ct. Schutt v. Mac-
Duff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 123 (1954) (dictum) ("... the constitutional
privilege would not bar the use in the prosecution of a defendant of the results of a .. .
test even though taken while he was so drunk as to be confused or unconscious or other-
wise in such a condition it may not be said that he voluntarily consented thereto .... ").
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ations as gross intoxication or serious injury where consent is nearly
always impossible to obtain. 120
Another singular modification in our implied consent law which
deserves special attention involves the admission into evidence of
the accused's refusal to submit to chemical testing.130 The appli-
cable provision provides that ". . . proof of refusal shall be admis-
sible . . . provided the person shall first have testified in the
action.""' The 'testify-first' clause as a condition precedent to the
admissibility of this type of evidence obviously appears to be a
reasonable reproduction into statutory form of the ruling laid down
in State v. Severson'12 In this case, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota reasoned that a statute providing that an accused shall not
be required to submit to a chemical test without his consent'2 2
necessarily implies that the results of such a test may not be re-
ceived in evidence unless he consented to the test. From this pre-
mise the court held that 'where the defendant has not testified' is
also to be implied that his refusal may not be admitted in evidence
against him.' Further, the fact that the defendant did what he
had an absolute right to do by statute, "without being subjected to
the liability that his exercise of the right may be used against
him," 13 ' was considered by the court to be in harmony with 'the
spirit of the criminal law.' Since the reasoning employed in Sever-
son stemmed from a former statute providing that no test shall be
obtained without the accused's consent, the question is now raised
whether the conclusion reached by the court is still valid in view of
our present statute which provides that a motorist impliedly con-
sents in advance to submit to a chemical test. We think not. Since
there is no longer a valid reason for a 'testify-first' clause as a con-
dition precedent to the admissibility into evidence of an accused's
refusal to submit to a chemical test, such 'evidence should now be
129. Cases cited note 128 supra; see Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Prac-
tical and Legal Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 673, 689 n. 51 (1960);
Note, 17 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 288, '306 (1960) ("... a logical extension.
130, See authorities cited at notes 104-11 supra and accompanying text.
131. N.D. Cent. Code § 29-20-08 (1960) (emphasis added). The italicized clause is
omitted from the same section in the UNIFORM ACT (see Appedix I), thereby making the
admission into evidence of the refusal unconditional.
132. 75 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1956).
133. N.D. Rev. Code § 39-0801 (Supp. 1957) (amended by N.D. Sess. Laws 1959, ch.
286), as amended, N.D. Cent. Code § 39-08-01 (1960).
134. 75 N.W.2d at 318 (no supporting authority cited).
135. Id. at 318. The court also relied on another statute which provides that "in the
trial of a criminal action . . . the defendant, at his own request and not otherwise, shall be
deemed a competent witness but his neglect or refusal to testify shall not create or raise any
nr-sumption of guilt against him. Nor shall such neglect or refusal be referred to .... "
N.D. Cent. Code § 29-21-11. It is submitted that the court's reliance thereon as substan-
tiating their holding was not valid, since the statute is applicable to the defendant only as




freely admissible. Such evidence should be looked upon like any
other act or statement voluntarily made and is competent for the
jury to consider and weigh with all the other evidence involved.
This point of view is buttressed by a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Idaho - an implied consent state - which held that evi-
dence of refusal to submit to a blood test was competent and ad-
missible.136 It should be noted that the court compared the North
Dakota and Idaho statutes and pointed out that under Idaho law a
motorist is deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test in
cdvance.13 Thus, although the implied consent laws grant the ac-
cused the privilege of refusal, it does not necessarily mean that com-
ment upon this refusal at trial will be unduly prejudicial to his
cause. Indeed, if the accused's refusal is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, there would seem to be no reason why he could not
successfully rebut any prejudicial presumptions raised against him
as a result of such comment at the trial, by simply taking the stand
and explaining the reasons for his refusal.
Another noticeable departure from the Uniform Act-and the other
implied consent statutes is the North Dakota provision which ex-
pressly recognizes the use of the Harger Drunkometer', as follows:
"The results of a test given by means of the Harger Drunkometer or
other similar device approved by the American Medical Association
and the National Safety Council shall be received in evidence 'when
it is shown that the test was fairly administered.""' This statutory
recognition of the scientific basis and reliability of the various
breath testing devices is a definite improvement and will preclude
the types of unfortunate decisions rendered in Michigan where it
was held that the Harger Drunkometer was not scientifically reli-
able. ' Whether this provision would eliminate the necessity of an
expert witness' testimony concerning the reliability of the various de-
vices remains in doubt. None of the devices have been given com-
plete judicial recognition, but the time of total acceptance seems
near. Ufitil the attainment of such recognition, the constitutional
and evidentiary aspects of this unique provision must await judicial
interpretation. Despite the roadblocks facing this provision, the
elimination of costly and complex scientific testimony would defi-
nitely improve upon the criminal prosecutions of drunken drivers.
136. State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958).
137. Idaho Code Ann. § 49-352 (Supp. 1955).
138. See discussion on the Harger Dunkorneter and other similar chemical testing devices
at text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
139. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-07(5) (1960).
i,0. People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949).
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The arguments raised in challenging the constitutionality of the
implied consent statutes are essentially those described before, chief
among which involve the privilege against self-incrimination, the
protection from unreasonable search and seizure, and the right of
due process of law. Since North Dakota's implied consent statute
was only recently enacted, it has not as yet been tested on the
grounds of these constitutional arguments. The statute, however,
should not encounter any constitutional problems when finally test-
ed by our courts, for similar implied consent laws in other jurisdic-
tions have been upheld when confronted with these identical argu-
ments.
Perhaps the most frequent argument raised against this particular
type of statute is that it violates the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. But this should not present any difficulty for one or two
good reasons: (1) because blood is physical evidence as contrasted
to the testimonial-physical evidence distinction; or (2) because of
a waiver of the privilege by reason of the advanced consent. As al-
ready mentioned, the overwhelming weight of authority differenti-
ates between testimonial and physical evidence which renders the
privilege not applicable to blood test results as they are considered
physical evidence."' However, if this distinction were not accepted
by our courts, 4 2 then the doctrine of waiver would effectively re-
but the objection. Under an implied statute, an accused may either
waive his privilege against self-incrimination by submitting to the
blood test, or lose his privilege to use the highways by refusing to
submit.143 Because of the pressing need for increased highway
safety it is within the valid exercise of the legislative power to so
condition the privilege to use the highways in such a manner and
to put such a choice to motorists."' Hence, the statute has not
141. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328
P.2d 1065 (1958); cf. State v.Pauley, 49 N.D. 488, 192 N.W. 91 (1922) (dictum). See
3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 720 (12th ed. 1955); 8 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE §§ 2263-65 (3d ed. 1940).
142. It seems likely that they do, however, for in State v. Pauley, 49 N.D. 488, 192
N.W. 91 (1922), the court, by way of dictum, referred to 8 WIGMORE § 2263 (3d ed.
1940) in employing the testimonial-physical evidence distinction to its decision. The court
pointed out that "... concerning the constitutional provision compelling one to be a witness
against himself . . . 'it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in
history and in the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion."' 129 N.W. at
92. (emphasis added).
143. "It is clear that the statute does not infringe upon any constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination . . . . (since) 'the accused is given the choice of waiving his
right against self-incrimination . . . or losing the privilege to continue driving on our
highways.'" Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 122 (1954), rev'd on
other grounds; accord, Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1955);
Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc.2d 25, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1958).
144. "Bearing in mind the purpose of the statute and that highway safety is a matter of
great concern to the public, it may not be held that it is unreasonable or beyond legisla-
NOTES
abridged the North Dakota motorist's privilege against self-incri-
mination, and when he submits to the proffered test he will have no
valid grounds on this objection.
The constitutional objection of unreasonable search and seizure
will have little or no effect upon the taking of tests under the pro-
visions of the North Dakota consent law. This, because the statute
provides that a motorist shall be requested to submit to a chemical
test ". . . only after placing such person ...under arrest and in-
forming him that he is or will be charged with the offense of driv-
ing ... while under the influence of intoxicating liquor."1 ' Since it
is a well-known and general proposition that a search and seizure
of one's person following his lawful arrest is not violative of any
law, the motorist who fails within the limits of this provision, may
legally be searched for evidence of the crime for which he was ar-
rested by means of a chemical test.14 Moreover, the statute simply
avoids any possible unreasonable search and seizure, because it is
premised upon the constructive consent of the motorist to submit to
the test when demanded. Further, the motorist is expressly given
the right to exercise his option of refusal. But even if the procedure
set forth in this provision were not complied with by the law en-
forcement officers of this state, the objection on the grounds that
the evidence obtained by such unlawful means constituted an un-
reasonable search and seizure, would still be unavailing. This, be-
cause North Dakota and twenty-four other states reject the federal
exclusionary rule1 41 and hold that the admissibility of evidence is not
affected by the illegal means in which it is obtained.14' Because of
this abject failure to ensure compliance with constitutional and sta-
tutory rights and because the courts are required to participate in,
or in effect condone, such unlawful conduct, it is urged that the
courts of this state adopt the exclusionary rule in order to secure the
protection of both the guaranteed rights and "the interests of society
in the suppression of crime.''149 Under the aegis of either rule, how-
tive power to put such a choice to a motorist who is accused upon reasonable grounds of
driving while intoxicated." Schutt v. MacDuff, supra note 143, at 122-23; see 2 WHAR-
TON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 663 (12th ed. 1955).
145. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-01 (1960). The UNIFORM ACT and the implied con-
sent statutes in the other seven jurisdictions also provided for an arrest as a condition
precedent to such request.
146. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1954).
147. See note 17 supra, which contains a breakdown of the states into groups of exclu-
sionary or non-exclusionary jurisdictions.
148. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925). See also text accompanying
notes 12-39 supra.
149. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 915 (1955).
In State v. Wolf, 164 A.2d 865 (Del. 1960), the court pointed out how the exclusion-
ary rule and an implied consent law are compatible to each other. Delaware does not yet
have an implied consent law, but adopts the federal exclusionary rule-the reverse of
19611
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ever, the unreasonable search and seizure objection will offer little
resistance and will be the least effective of the constitutional argu-
ments in this state.
The usual due process objection would also seem unavailing
since, by the very terms of the implied consent statute, no force is
authorized in any degree. This is because no test is to be given if the
accused refuses to submit, but his license to drive shall be revoked
if such refusal was unreasonable.'" Of course, when the accused
submits there is still no violation of due process if, as declared in
Breithaupt v. Abram,1 ' the test is performed by qualified person-
nel' 1 in the proper manner and without violence.
A violation of due process was successfully challenged under the
original New York statute,"' in Schutt v. MacDuff."' The court
held the statute to be constitutionally sound except for two fail-
ures - it did not provide for a lawful arrest by a police officer and
failed to afford the driver an opportunity to have a hearing2 55
These objections have since been met by legislative amendment and
the statute, as amended, 156 is now held not to violate due process
on any theory."' Consequently, under the North Dakota statute,
this objection should certainly not prove troublesome for the ob-
jections as outlined are included in its provisions."'
North Dakota's state of the law. The defendant, Volf, was acquitted of the conviction of
driving while intoxicated because the specimen of blood was obtained while he was un-
conscious, thereby rendering the results of the test into evidence as inadmissible. In hold-
ing their decision as unfortunate, the court, nevertheless, pointed out that this could be
obviated in the future since:
... the State is not helpless to remedy this situation. We can see no reason
why the State in the exercise of its police power in licensing drivers . can-
not, by statute, impose as a condition to obtaining such a license that, by his ac-
ceptance of a license to drive, the applicant shall be deemed to have given his
consent to submit to chemical analysis .. ." 164 A.2d at 868.
150. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-04 (1960) provides: "If a person under arrest refuses
to submit . . . none shall be given, but the state highway commissioner, upon receipt of a
sworn report of the law enforcement officer that he had reasonable grounds to believe the
arrested person had been driving . . while under the influence . . . shall revoke his
license .... "
151. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
152. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-02 (1960) provides for ".. a physician or a qualified
technician, chemist or registered nurse .
This type of statute does not infringe upon an individual's rights or impair his in-
dividual liberty any more than does a statute which requires a pre-marital blood test before
a marriage license application may be filed. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-12 (1960) provides
for pre-marital syphilis tests.
153. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 71-a (1953).
154. 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 ( 195 4 ).
155. "Conscientious approval may not be given to a statute authorizing the final revoca-
tion of a drivers' license by loose and informal procedure, for thereby 'every automobile
driver in the State will be at the mercy of the commissioner and his assistants.' " Id. at
127. (citations omitted).
156. N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1194(1).
157. Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc.2d 25, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
158. The test may be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer only
rftc placing the -ccused under arrest and informing him of the charge. N.D. Cent. Code
§ 39-20-01 (1960).
An administrative hearing is granted by the State Highway Commissioner upon his
receiving a written request from the person who has had his license revoked. N.D. Cent.
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Other cases have found no coercion even where the accused was
warned that his license might be revoked should he fail to submit
to the test.159 Further, the fact that the statute does not expressly
require a warning by the police that the accused's refusal may re-
sult in the revocation of his license does not violate due process of
law." ' However, the New York Court of Appeals has stated that
"it is undoubtedly the better practice for the police to notify the
person of his rights .. ,,I' It also seems necessary, in properly
notifying the accused of his rights, to inform him of the alternative
choices of tests provided for in the statute, to which he may comply
by simply selecting the one which is the least burdensome or offen-
sive to him.'1 2  This point of view is buttressed by the recent de-
cision in Ringwood v. State,'G3 where the court held that the arrest-
ing officer had not complied with the requirements of the statute
when he confronted the accused with the choice of submitting to a
blood test only, or of having his license revoked."' Another case
held that where the accused was acquitted of the drunken driving
charge, the licensing agency still had the power to revoke his
driver's license in the administrative hearing, since this was a sepa-
rate proceeding from the criminal charge.' It is conceivable that
many other problems will arise in the everyday application of this
statute by the law enforcement officers, and it is adamantly sug-
gested that the various law enforcement agencies establish stand-
ard procedures and techniques compatible with its provisions in
Code § 39-20-05 (1960). Further, if the revocation is sustained, such person may appeal
to the district court for a rehearing of the matter thereby providing judicial review of the
administrative agency's determination. N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-06 (1960).
159. People v. Davidson, 5 Misc.2d 699, 152 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd on
other grounds, stating that "the trooper's advice was proper, it was a gratuitous offering of
information as to the provisions of the statute, which the defendant was not required to
accept ...... " 152 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
160. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
161. People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73, 120 N.E.2d 211, 214 (1954) (emphasis added).
The basic premise upon which the court relied fo rthis procedural caveat was that the
line between (onsent and coercion is difficult to determine whenever the request is made
by a policeman, as such.
162. N.D. Cent. Code §39-20-01 (1960) provides that "any person who operates a motor
vehicle . . . shall be deemed to have given consent . . . to a chemical test of his blood,
breath, saliva, or urine .... "' (emphasis added).
163. 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959).
164. "The statute is . . . so designed advisedly with the thought in mind that under
some circumstances it might be impractical, or even dangerous, if it were mandatory that
all persons so arrested give a test of a particular substance." Id. at 944.
The applic.be provision in the Utah implied consent law provides for the accused to
submit to a chemical test of his ". . . breath, blood, or urine. ... Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44.10 (Supp. I257) (emphasis added). Note the similar connective of the dis-
juncture "or" in the No-th Dakota provision cited in note 162 supra.
The Nebraska implied consent statute has provided a unique provision in that it ex-
pressly provides that "the person so arrested . . . may choose whether the test so required
shall be a chemical test of his blood or urine." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727.04 (1960).
165. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955); accord,
Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc.2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. St. 1956).
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order to ensure more successful prosecutions in the courts of North
Dakota
From the foregoing discussion, it is our considered opinion that
North Dakota has taken a very commendable step in the direction
of clearing its highways of the menace of drunken driving. Through
the adoption of a statute which implies consent to submit to a
chemical test, the conviction rate should increase and the accident-
due-to-alcohol rate should decrease. For those who drive after
taking 'one more for the road,' many will find that it will no longer
be too difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they were,
in fact as well as law, inebriated. This, because the statute pro-
vides for the obtaining of definite evidence as to the state of in-
toxication in advance - unhindered by the usual obstacles of bellig-
erent motorists and frustrating public policy. More specifically,
the statute provides for the elimination of guesswork from the pro-
secution of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
cases; it protects innocent victims, for the tests may exonerate as
well as convict; and, most significantly, it helps eliminate the drunk
driver - Public Enemy No. 1 - from North Dakota's streets and
highways.
FREDRICK R. ALM III
RANDOLPH E. STEFANSON.
GROUND WATER: WHAT IS THE LAW
IN NORTH DAKOTA?
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the seventeen states west of a line drawn from North
Dakota to Texas have had or are having problems dealing with
groundwater law. This becomes increasingly significant now be-
cause of the increasing shortage of water faced by these states.1
The question usually presented is whether a legislature can validly
change the law on the subject because in so doing they might be
depriving some of their citizens of vested rights. This question
brings forth the question of what is a vested right. This situation
is further complicated in North Dakota because of two apparently
conflicting statutes. Statute 47-01-13 declares the overlying land-
1. See Hutchins, Trends in the Statutory Law of Ground Water in the Western States,
34 Texas L. Rev. 157, 182 (1955).
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